Law

1. Sundquist v. State, 122 F. Supp. 3d 876 (D. Nebraska 2015) (Sundquist may have agreed to participate in A.A. as a term of his probationary license. But that choice — to participate in A.A. or lose his livelihood — may have been the result of state-sponsored coercion rather than a voluntary choice. See Jackson, 747 F.3d  at 541.  At this stage of litigation, it is too early to say that by agreeing, Sundquist has forfeited his claim. In sum, the Court finds that Sundquist has alleged a plausible claim under the Establishment Clause, and that defendants Vierk and Schuldt are not entitled to qualified immunity, because the rights sought to be vindicated implicate firmly grounded Constitutional principles.) https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=16871371844519358192&q=747+F.+3d+537+&hl=en&as_sdt=4006
2. Jackson v.  Nixon, 747 F. 3d 537. (8th Cir. 2014) (Concluding that based on the allegations in the complaint, Randall Jackson has pled facts sufficient to state a claim that a parole stipulation requiring him to attend and complete a substance abuse program with religious content in order to be eligible for early parole violates the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.) https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=4167135450736042917&q=747+F.+3d+537+&hl=en&as_sdt=4006
3. Hazle v. Crofoot, 727 F.3d 983 (9th Cir. 2013) (noting with approval the granting of  summary judgment for plaintiff on his claim that forcing him into a 12 step religious based treatment program, when he was an atheist, was a violation of the First Amendment and granting a new trial on Plaintiffs’ request for compensatory damages. Instead of a retrial, the matter was reportedly settled with the state paying $1M and the treatment agency $925K, see http://www.sacbee.com/news/local/crime/article2768782.html)
4. Hazle v. Crofoot, 2:08-cv-02295-GEB-KJM (E. D. Calif. 4-6-2010) (granting summary judgment for plaintiff on his claim that forcing him into a 12 step religious based treatment program, when he was an atheist, was a violation of the First Amendment)
5. Norton v. Kootenai County, CV09-58-N-EJL (D. Idaho 9-11-2009) (where claimant originally asked to go to facility that used AA, and never notified his probation officer of his religious objection to going to AA meetings, no First Amendment violation)
6. Thorne v. Hale, No. 1:08cv601 (JCC), 2009 WL 980136 (E.D. Va. 2009)  (holding that a valid § 1983 civil rights claim was presented in the complaint, where the complaint stated that Hale and Killian were to some extent responsible for implementing the treatment regimen which included mandatory participation in AA/NA); Compl. at 15, Thorne v. Hale, No. 1:08cv601 (JCC), 2009 WL 980136 (E.D. Va. Mar. 26, 2009) (claiming that Killian "was responsible for all recommendations to Drug Court for treatment and clinical matters," including "substance abuse issues."); id. at 76 (claiming that Thorne was "subjected to the State religions of AA and NA by . . . [the] directors" of the Drug Court and the RACSB); id. at 89 (alleging due process deprivations by the "Directors" of the RACSB and the Drug Court). Members of the drug court ultimately prevailed in the Thorne v. Hale litigation, when the trial court granted summary judgment on the basis of absolute judicial immunity and dismissed the case. Id. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the granting of the summary judgment motion.
7. Thorne v. Hale, No. 09-2305, WL1018048 (4th Cir. Mar. 19, 2010)  Thorne v. Hale is noteworthy, even in light of the dismissal, because the initial dismissal motion was denied and because, when coupled with Hanas v. Inner City Christian Outreach, the authority makes it patently clear that First Amendment violations can have consequences for drug court staff. Id. Hanas, 542 F. Supp. 2d at 683.
8. Hanas v. Inner City Christian Outreach, 542 F. Supp. 2d 683, 683 (E.D. Mich. 2008) (holding that the drug court program manager and the drug court consultant were liable for actions related to referral to faith based program, when they knew of participant’s objections while in the program, and when the program denied the participant the opportunity to practice his chosen faith – Catholicism)
9. Americans United v. Prison Fellowship, 509 F.3d 406, 406 (8th Cir. 2007) (holding that a state supported non-coercive, non-rewarding faith based program violated the Establishment Clause of the U.S. Constitution because an alternative was not available).
10. Inouye v. Kemna, 504 F.3d 705, 705 (9th Cir. 2007) (concluding that parole officer had lost qualified immunity because he forced AA on Buddhist)
11. In re Garcia, 24 P.3d 1091, 1091 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001) (given the non-religious classes available to Garcia, we conclude that DOC did not coerce him into participating in a religious program)
12. Bausch v. Sumiec, 139 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1029 (E.D. Wis. 2001) (an offender cannot be said to have freely chosen a religiously-oriented treatment program as an alternative to revocation unless a meaningful secular alternative is also offered)
13. Alexander v. Schenk, 118 F. Supp. 2d 298, 300 n.1 (N.D. NY 2000) (The sincerity of Plaintiff's professed religious beliefs has no bearing on the Constitutional issue of whether Defendants coerced him into participating in religion or its exercise.)
14. Yates v. Cunningham, 70 F. Supp. 2d 47, 49 (D.N.H. 1999) (injunctive relief was moot  remedy and damages barred by immunity, when defendant sought  order barring defendants from conditioning early release or parole on a prisoner's attendance at AA-based programs, and forcing defendants to recognize Rational Recovery as a viable alternative to AA-based programs)
15. Arnold v. Tenn. Bd. of Trs., 956 S.W. 2d 478, 484 (Tenn. 1997) (mandating a religious based 12 step program without a secular alternative violates the Establishment Clause)
16. Warner v. Orange County Dep’t of Prob., 115 F.3d 1068, 1068 (2d Cir. 1997), aff’d, 173 F.3d 120 (2d Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1003 (1999) (holding that the county governmental agency violated the Establishment Clause by requiring DUI probationer to participate in A.A.)
17. Warburton v. Underwood, 2 F. Supp. 2d 306, 316-318 (W.D.N.Y 1998) (The emphasis placed on God, spirituality and faith in a "higher power" by twelve-step programs such as A.A. or N.A. clearly supports a determination that the underlying basis of these programs is religious and that participation in such programs constitutes a religious exercise. It is an inescapable conclusion that coerced attendance at such programs therefore violates the Establishment Clause.)
18. Griffin v. Coughlin, 673 N.E.2d 98, 98 (N.Y. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1054 (1997) (holding that conditioning desirable privilege – family visitation – on prisoner’s participation in program that incorporated Alcoholics Anonymous doctrine was unconstitutional because it violated the Establishment Clause)
19. Kerr v. Farrey, 95 F.3d 472, 479-80 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that the prison violated the Establishment Clause by requiring attendance at Narcotics Anonymous meetings which used “God” in its treatment approach)

1. Americans United v. Prison Fellowship, 509 F.3d 406, 406 (8th Cir. 2007) (holding that a state supported non-coercive, non-rewarding faith based program violated the Establishment Clause of the U.S. Constitution because an alternative was not available).
2. Turner v. Hickman, 342 F. Supp.2d 887 (E. D. Calif. 9-30-2004) (granting injunction in prisoners favor, which removed any non-compliance with NA from his record and required secular option, even though secular alternative now available because without injunction “it would leave defendants free to return to their old ways.”)
3. Freedom from Religion Foundation, Inc. v. McCallum, No. 00-C-617-C (W. D. Wis. 2002) (no First Amendment violation, when secular alternative available)
4. In re Garcia, 24 P.3d 1091, 1093 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001) (holding that mandating attendance AA/NA classes does violate the Establishment Clause. But where, as here, alternative classes without religious-based content are provided, there is no constitutional violation.)
5. O’Connor v. California, 855 F. Supp. 303, 308 (C.D. Cal. 1994) (finding that the Establishment Clause was not violated because the DUI probationer had several choices of programs, including self-help programs that are not premised on monotheistic deity)

1. Cox v. Miller, 296 F.3d 89, 89 (2d Cir. 2002) (holding that a confession to murder in an AA meeting was not protected by cleric-congregant privilege, despite 5th step requiring participant to admit to God, other human beings, and themselves the exact nature of their wrongs).
2. U.S. v. Schwensow, 151 F.3d 650 (7th Cir. 1998) (AA volunteer phone operators, were not counselors or therapists)
3. State v. Boobar, 637 A.2d 1162 (Me. 1994) (under Maine evidentiary privilege statute, therapist-patient privilege not apply to AA peer group sessions)

1. State v. Klie, 174 P.3d 358 (Hawaii 2007) (supporting a prohibition against entering Waikiki area)
2. People v. Rizzo, 842 N.E.2d 727, 727 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005) (factors often used in determining whether the restriction is reasonable include whether the defendant has a compelling need to go through/to the area; a mechanism for supervised entry into the area; the geographic size of the restricted area, and the relationship between the restriction and the rehabilitation needs of the offender.)
3. State v. Wright, 739 N.E.2d 1172, 1172 (Ohio Ct. App. 2000) (reversing prohibition of entering any place where alcohol is distributed, served, consumed, given away, or sold because it restricted the defendant from grocery stores and the vast majority of all residences)
4. Johnson v. State, 547 So. 2d 1048, 1048 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (prohibiting defendant from being near high drug areas)
5. People v. Pickens, 542 N.E.2d 1253, 1253 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989) (prohibition against entering town of Champaign, Ill. reasonably related to rehabilitation)
6. People v. Beach, 195 Cal. Rptr. 381, 385 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983) (holding unconstitutional defendant’s banishment from the community where she has lived for the last 24 years)
7. Oyoghok v. Municipality of Anchorage, 641 P.2d 1267, 1267 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982) (conditioning probation on not being within a two block radius in an area where red light area existed)
8. State v. Morgan, 389 So. 2d 364, 364 (La. 1980) (prohibiting entrance into the French Quarter)

1. People v. Amparan, No. F064011, Court of Appeals of California, Fifth District, Filed July 1, 2013. NOT SELECTED (probation terms in drug court, including association restrictions were not unconstitutionally vague)
2. Malone v. State 2012 Ark. App. 280, (Opinion Delivered April 25, 2012) (The court said Malone had previously been afforded leniency and ordered to drug court. As a condition of that sentence she was prohibited from consorting with felons. However, as the trial court noted, after completing the alternative program, she once again involved herself with known felons, such as Sparks. The court then concluded that because "she put herself back in a position to be involved with people that she was already trained and educated on through Drug Court not to be with . . . she does not earn the right to get a probationary sentence.)
3. In the Interest of C.K., Case No. 2D12-633,District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District (Opinion filed May 4, 2012)(failure to give notice of FDTC hearing which limited parental contact was a due process violation)
4. U.S. v. Burroughs, 613 F.3d 233 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (incidental or non-intentional contact not prohibited)
5. State v. Allen, 370 S.C. 88, 634 S.E.2d 653 (2006) (probation condition prohibiting association with a person with a criminal record, courts generally have upheld such a condition on the ground it is related to the crime for which the offender was convicted, is intended to prevent future criminal conduct, or bears a reasonable relationship to an offender's rehabilitation.)
6. State v. Hearn, 128 P.3d 139, 139 (Wash. Ct. App. 2006) (prohibiting the association with drug users or dealers is constitutional)
7. Andrews v. State, 623 S.E.2d 247, 247 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005) (restricting drug court participant from associating with drug users and dealers)
8. People v. Jungers, 25 Cal. Rptr. 3d 873, 873 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005) (prohibiting contact with wife)
9. Commonwealth v. LaPointe, 759 N.E.2d 294, 294 (Mass. 2001) (could not reside with minor children)
10. People v. Forsythe, 43 P.3d 652, 652 (Colo. App. Ct. 2001) (prohibiting unsupervised contact with his own children)
11. Jones v. State, 41 P.3d 1247, 1247 (Wyo. 2001) (prohibiting contact with persons of disreputable character)
12. Dawson v. State, 894 P.2d 672, 672 (Alaska Ct. App. 1995) (holding the restriction of unsupervised contact with drug using wife was too broad)
13. Birzon v. King, 469 F.2d 1241, 1242 (2d Cir. 1972) (cannot associate with persons who have criminal records)

1. State v. Olsen, 399 P. 3d 1141 (Wash.  Supreme Court 2017) (Washington Supreme Court upholding random drug testing of DUI probationer: Olsen was convicted of a crime and is still in the State's legal custody. Simms, 10 Wash.App. at 82, 516 P.2d 1088. She has a duty to engage in her rehabilitation in exchange for the privilege of being relieved from jail time and "should expect close scrutiny" of her conduct. Lucas, 56 Wash.App. at 241, 783 P.2d 121; see also City of Spokane v. Marquette, 146 Wash.2d 124, 132, 43 P.3d 502 (2002) “Random UAs are a permissible means here. UAs are an important monitoring tool utilized by courts during the rehabilitative process of probation. See, e.g., Williams, 97 Wash.App. at 260, 983 P.2d 687 (authorizing requirement that probationer submit to a breath test, blood test, or UA upon probation officer's request); KING COUNTY DRUG DIVERSION COURT, PARTICIPANT HANDBOOK 5-7 (2015) (drug court participants required to participate in random, observed UAs) http://www.kingcounty.gov/=/media/courts/Clerk/drugCourt/documents/KCDDC_Participant_Handbook.ashx?la=en [https://perma.cc/UT69-GJXA]. Unannounced testing is, arguably, crucial if a court is to impose drug testing at all.[4] Random testing seeks to deter the probationer from consuming drugs or alcohol by putting her on notice that drug use can be discovered at any time. It also promotes rehabilitation and accountability by providing the probation officer with a "practical mechanism to determine whether rehabilitation is indeed taking place." Macias v. State, 649 S.W.2d 150, 152 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983) (weekly UAs)”.) Additionally, as noted by the National Drug Court Institute, "it is crucial that samples be collected in a random, unannounced manner," as random testing prevents individuals from planning ahead and avoiding detection.[5] Requiring reasonable suspicion as a basis to test could make it prohibitively difficult for the probation officer to carry out his or her responsibilities of supervising the probationer and accurately assessing progress toward rehabilitation. See State v. Zeta Chi Fraternity, 142 N.H. 16, 28, 696 A.2d 530 (1997) (citing State v. Berrocales, 141 N.H. 262, 681 A.2d 95 (1996)).
2. State v. Barth (Iowa Court of Appeals 2016) A majority of the courts across the nation that have considered the issue have concluded that "consent-search provisions in probation agreements constitute a waiver of search-and-seizure rights." Id. at 792-93 (citing cases); see also, e.g., United States v. Barnett, 415 F.3d 690, 691 (7th Cir.2005) ("Constitutional rights like other rights can be waived, provided that the waiver is knowing and intelligent, as it was here."); State v. Gawron, 112 Idaho 841, 736 P.2d 1295, 1297 (1987) (upholding warrantless search of probationer based on consent contained in probation agreement); People v. Absher, 242 Ill.2d 77, 351 Ill.Dec. 163, 950 N.E.2d 659, 668 (2011) (upholding suspicionless search based on consent to a warrantless search).
3. US v. Laurent, 861 F. Supp. 2d 71  (ED New York 2011) (collecting cases where an indictee may also be subject to pre-trial release conditions that infringe upon his constitutional rights, provided that there has been an independent judicial determination that such conditions are necessary.)
4. Sanders v. Bishop, 1:06-cv-01264 OWW GSA (E .D. Calif. 12-29-2008) (collecting cases reflecting search waivers permissible in probation and parolee cases)
5. Butler v. Kato, 154 P.3d 259, 259 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007) (following United States v. Scott, 450 F.3d 863, 863 (9th Cir. 2006) (concluding that a search waiver is probably improper when a person is on bond))
6. Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 847, 847 (2006) (holding consent to search by parolee negated necessity of establishing reasonable suspicion, but search could not be for harassment)
7. State v. Kouba, 709 N.W. 2d 299, 299 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006) (recognizing that a waiver is sufficient in probation cases)
8. United States v. Scott, 450 F.3d 863, 863 (9th Cir. 2006) (concluding that a search waiver is probably improper when a person is on bond)
9.  State v. McAuliffe, 125 P.3d 276, 276 (Wyo. 2005) (recognizing complete waiver, but search must be reasonable)
10. State ex rel. A.C.C., 44 P.3d 708, 708 (Utah 2002) (recognizing waiver in juvenile case, but limited case to the facts)
11. State v. Ullring, 741 A.2d 1065, 1065 (Me. 1999) (holding that a search waiver as a condition of bond is constitutional)
12. Terry v. Superior Court, 86 Cal. Rptr. 2d 653, 653 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999) (holding that a 4th Amendment waiver is an improper condition in diversion case, without statutory authority)
13. In re York, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d 308, 308 (Cal. 1995) (4th Amendment waiver is an improper condition in diversion case, without statutory authority)

1. State v. HIROCKE, Wash: Court of Appeals, 3rd Div. 4/21/2021 (Drug Court contract was not illusory because judge retained the sole discretion to determine if it had been violated) https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=294284901581971941&hl=en&lr=lang_en&as_sdt=4006&as_vis=1&oi=scholaralrt&hist=f_OieYgAAAAJ:16291440605429870550:AAGBfm2bewqYRsZimbqczymuCsR0HBsHvw&html=&folt=kw
2. People v. Howard, 190 AD 3d 1108 - NY: Appellate Div., 3rd Dept. 2021(improper waiver of appeal in drug court entry plea) https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=1285462912974287379&q=%22drug+court%22&hl=en&scisbd=2&as_sdt=6,44&as_ylo=2020  but see People v. Miller, 190 AD 3d 1029 (2021) https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=6139188818908135764&q=%22drug+court%22&hl=en&scisbd=2&as_sdt=6,44&as_ylo=2020
3. Commonwealth v. Eldred, 480 Mass. 90 (Mass: Supreme Judicial Court 2018) (We conclude that, in appropriate circumstances, a judge may order a defendant who is addicted to drugs to remain drug free as a condition of probation, and that a defendant may be found to be in violation of his or her probation by subsequently testing positive for an illegal drug.)
4. People v. Bird, Cal: Court of Appeal, 4th Appellate Dist., 1st Div. 2018 (not selected) (upholding an electronic search condition of probation)
5. US v. Laurent, 861 F. Supp. 2d 71  (ED New York 2011) (collecting cases where an indictee may also be subject to pre-trial release conditions that infringe upon his constitutional rights, provided that there has been an independent judicial determination that such conditions are necessary.)
6. Idaho v. Doe, 233 P.3d 1275 (Idaho 2010) (Requiring parents to undergo drug testing as part of daughter’s juvenile probation is a violation of the parent’s 4th Amendment rights)
7. Strickland v. State, 300 Ga. App. 898, 686 S.E.2d 486  (2009) (Restrictions placed on Strickland's driving privileges and the requirements that she install an ignition interlock device in her vehicle and submit to a DUI court evaluation are not punishment. Considering Strickland's three prior convictions for driving while under the influence, these measures are rationally related to an alternative purpose as they are designed to prevent Strickland from being a danger to the community by committing future acts of driving under the influence while she was awaiting trial.)
8. United States v. Jordan, 485 F.3d 982, 982 (7th Cir. 2007) (holding that alcohol use restrictions as part of supervised release should be based upon need).
9. United States v. Scott, 450 F.3d 863, 863 (9th Cir. 2006) (Government did not demonstrate a pattern of "drug use leading to nonappearance" in court, nor point to an individualized determination that Scott's drug use was likely to lead to his nonappearance, thus drug testing as a condition of bond inappropriate)
10. Payne v. State, 615 S.E. 2d 564, 564 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005) (no alcohol as condition of probation upheld)
11. State v. Patton, 119 P.3d 250, 250 (Ore. Ct. App. 2005) (non consumption of alcohol as term of probation must be based on demonstrated need—here not met)
12. State v. Jakubowski, 822 A.2d 1193 (Maine 2003)(Requiring drug court as condition of post-conviction bond is statutorily permissible)
13. Commonwealth v. Williams, 801 N.E. 2d 804, 804 (Mass. App. Ct. 2004) (The judge at a probation surrender hearing could lawfully impose as a condition of probation that the defendant not consume or possess any alcohol during the term of his probation, where the condition was reasonably related to the goals of sentencing and probation.)
14. Steiner v. State, 763 N.E. 2d 1024, 1024 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (Trial court must make an individualized determination that the accused is likely to use drugs while on bail before it is reasonable to place restrictions on the individual based on that contingency.)
15. Carswell v. State, 721 N.E.2d 1255, 1255 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999) (alcohol prohibition based upon rehabilitation needs of offender)
16. People v. Beal, 70 Cal. Rptr. 2d 80, 80 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997) (“Based on the relationship between alcohol and drug use, we conclude that substance abuse is reasonably related to the underlying crime and that alcohol use may lead to future criminality where the defendant has a history of substance abuse and is convicted of a drug-related offense.” Thus, use of  alcohol prohibition proper probation condition.)
17. Oliver v. U.S., 682 A.2d 186, 192 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (upholding drug testing conditions)
18. Martell v. County Court, 854 P.2d 1327, 1327 (Colo. Ct. App. 1992) (holding that if a condition of bail is to refrain from the use of alcohol or drugs, supervision may include drug or alcohol testing)
19.  Berry v. Dist. of Columbia, 833 F.2d 1031, 1035 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (If the trial court finds that drug testing and treatment are only required when there is an individualized determination that an arrestee will use drugs while released pending trial, then the District's testing program will more likely than not be found reasonable. Individualized suspicion should be based on evidence of prior drug use, such as drug-related convictions or self-reported drug use.)

1. Gincley v. State, Fla: Dist. Court of Appeals, 4th Dist. 3/27/2019 (County administrative order giving defendants only one chance at drug court could not supplant state statute with no such restriction.)
2. People v. Koontz, 166 AD 3d 1215 (NY: Appellate Div. 3rd Dept. 2018) (waiver of right to appeal)
3. People v. Feher, 2018 NY Slip Op 6653 (NY: Appellate Div., 4th Dept. 2018)
4. People v. Guerrero, 2018 IL App (3d) 170786 - Ill: Appellate Court, 3rd Dist. 2018 (failure to properly advise defendant of immigration consequences invalidates plea under Padilla)
5. Commonwealth v. TIBETS, Mass: Appeals Court 2018 (setting aside sentencing hearing where defendant appeared without proper waiver of counsel and Court denied drug court and sentenced defendant to incarceration, despite extensive drug history.  The appellate panel observed: “We add this final note about the defendant's argument that the sentencing judge abused his discretion in electing to revoke his probation and impose a sentence of incarceration on January 4, 2017, after acknowledging that as far back as November 1, 2016, the defendant had a longstanding problem with drugs. It is not within our power to review a lawful sentence. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Derouin, 31 Mass. App. Ct. 969 (1992), and cases cited. Nevertheless, we believe notice should be taken of the "important and special role of the drug court in achieving important public policy interests." Deputy Chief Counsel for the Pub. Defender Div. of the Comm. for Pub. Counsel Servs. v. Acting First Justice of the Lowell Div. of the Dist. Ct. Dept., 477 Mass. 178, 187 (2017). The Massachusetts Trial Court has expanded the number of drug courts and encourages judges to recommend appropriate defendants to be screened for participation in such programs. See Arrowood, "Racing in the Right Direction:" Specialty Courts in Massachusetts, 60 Boston Bar J. 1 (Spring 2016); Ellis, Drug Courts Impact Participants, Courts, and Communities, 59 Boston Bar J. 12 (Winter 2015); Sullivan, The Development and Implementation of Specialty Courts in Massachusetts, 59 Boston Bar J. 9 (Winter 2015). See also Latessa & Reitler, What Works in Reducing Recidivism and How Does It Relate to Drug Courts?, 41 Ohio N.U. L. Rev. 757, 775 (2015) (Well-designed drug courts produce a statistically significantly greater reduction in recidivism than incarceration).”
6. People v. Sumter, 2018 NY Slip Op 354 (NY: Appellate Div., 3rd Dept. 2018) (waiver of right to appeal was valid, as part of drug court entry contract)
7. Christopher C. Edwards and Jacob B. Vail, “A Call to End Prospective Waivers of Judicial Disqualification in Accountability Courts”, The Champion, January-February 2014
8. People v. Coats, 2018 NY Slip Op 983 (NY: Appellate Div., 4th Dept. 2018) ("Although the drug court contract [signed by defendant] contained a written waiver of the right to appeal, County Court did not conduct any colloquy concerning that waiver at the plea proceeding . . ., and we conclude that the contract alone is insufficient to establish a valid waiver")
9. State v. Hensley, Iowa: Supreme Court 2018 (finding that jail treatment facility was community correctional residential treatment facility and defendant was entitled to credit for time spent there when he failed to complete the drug treatment program)
10. People v. Juarez, 2017 COA 127 (Colo.  Court of Appeals, 4th Div. 2017) (Court sufficiently complied with Padilla in advising defendant it was probable he would be deported for his plea to drug offense and therefore plea was voluntary)
11. IN THE MATTER OF TB, 168 A. 3d 83, 451 NJ Super. 391 (NJ: Appellate Div., 2017) (In sum, we remand the three Drug Court expungement applications for reconsideration. Assuming the State can demonstrate that the applicant has a potentially disqualifying conviction under N.J.S.A. 2C:52-2(c)(3), the applicant shall bear the burden to establish that expungement of that conviction would serve the public interest, as required by N.J.S.A. 2C:52-2(c)(3). The court shall make the appropriate finding consistent with the principles set forth above and in Kollman.) Kearney v. BUREAU OF PROFESSIONAL AND OCCUPATIONAL AFFAIRS, (Pa: Commonwealth Court 2017) (admissions made by physician’s assistant in plea used to enter drug court could not bar him from reobtaining his license, where he successfully completed drug court and charges were dismissed.)
12. State v. Bowling, 2017 Ohio 8539, (Ohio: Court of Appeals, 12th Appellate Dist. 2017) (Curfew was not sufficient confinement to entitle defendant to jail time credits on sentence)
13. Callis v. State,  Not Selected for Publication, (Ind. Court of Appeals  11/20/2017) (Defendant not entitled to credit for time spent in diversion drug court because if court were to award offenders credit for time spent in diversion programs prior to sentencing, it would diminish the reward for completing the program and ultimately be rewarding offenders for their failure.)
14. Hendrick v. KNOEBEL, (SD Indiana 5/10/2017) (“Though we need not rule on Defendants' argument concerning the waiver provision in the DTC Agreement, we note our serious doubts as to its enforceability under Indiana contract law, given the conspicuous lack of parity between the parties, the absence of specificity in the provision's language, the fact that it purports to absolve the DTC's employees of liability for intentionally tortious conduct, and the fact that the DTC Program is an entity of the local government performing a public service. See generally LaFrenz v. Lake Cty. Fair Bd., 360 N.E.2d 605, 608 (Ind. Ct. App. 1977). Moreover, because the provision implicates federal common law by purporting to waive federal statutory and constitutional rights, the likelihood of its enforceability is increasingly remote. Federal courts are rightly skeptical, albeit not uniformly dismissive, of claims that a plaintiff has waived his constitutional rights or has released a defendant from liability for violating them. We "indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of fundamental constitutional rights," Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938); Bayo v. Napolitano, 593 F.3d 495, 503 (7th Cir. 2010), and we acquiesce in a waiver only if it has been "knowing, intelligent, and voluntary." Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 484 (2007). The lack of specific language in the agreement before us, in conjunction with its prospectivity, not only falls short of eliciting "an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege," Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 292-93 (1988), but also encourages DTC staffers to violate the DTC participants' constitutional rights, knowing they are acting with impunity. Enforcing such an agreement is inconsistent with the public interest given its potential for abuse and cancellation of the participants' primary means of vindication.”)
15. People v. Sampson, 2017 NY Slip Op 3291 - NY: Appellate Div., 4th Dept. 2017 (Defendant’s lack of colloquy with the court on waiver of right to appeal in drug court contract was ineffective to waive appellate rights, but the defendant did not properly perfect his appeal)
16. People v. Mason, 2016 Slip Op 07527 (N.Y. App. Div. 11/10/16) (Drug Court contract that waives the right to appeal not sufficient to waive right without knowing & voluntary waiver in colloquy with judge)
17. State v. Lapianka, Not Selected for Official Publiaction (N.J. Super. App. Div., 2015) (Failure to fully advise as to deportation consequences does not constitute a knowing and intelligent waiver)
18. State v, Fleming, ___ S. 2d ___, (Georgia 6/29/15) (neither by agreement or statute is defendant entitled to credit on her sentence for time spent in drug court)
19. People v. McCaslin, 2014 IL App (2d) 130571 NOT SELECTED FOR PUBLICATION (Ill. App. 12-11-2014) (Defendant waived his right to appeal as part of entry to drug court, so appeal from termination from drug court  dismissed)
20. State v, Fox, 2013 S.D. 40 (2013) (an agreement in which a defendant gives up his right to voluntarily enter a plea of his or her choice as a condition of participating in a diversion drug court is unenforceable.)
21. Perry v. State, No. 39A01-1312-CR-517. (Ind. App. 2014) (Person in drug court on electronic home monitor not entitled to credit for time served while on monitor)
22. State v. Hewson, 178 Wn. App. 1043 (2014) (Due process requires the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt all the necessary facts of the crime charged. A defendant in drug court who agrees to have his guilt determined based on documentary evidence does not waive his right to have that determination established beyond a reasonable doubt, but such proof can be established by documentary evidence.)
23. State v. Calvin, 12-0618 (Iowa 11-1-2013),  reversing State v. Calvin, 829 N.W.2d. 193 (Iowa 2013) (Accordingly, we remand the case to the district court to modify its sentencing order to grant Calvin credit for time served in residential treatment at the IRTC and in the county jail as punishment for violations of the drug court program, but not for time served in the county jail for contempt.)
24. People v. Brignolle, 2013 NY Slip Op 23330, 971 N.Y.S.2d 866 (10-1-2013) (Court permits entry into diversion drug court, without entry of plea, because of potential deportation consequences)
25. People v. Ramirez, No. C071056. Court of Appeals of California, Third District, Lassen,     Filed June 18, 2013. NOT SELECTED (waiver of pre-sentence confinement credit consisting of  sanction jail time imposed in drug court was knowing and voluntary)
26. State v. Orlando, 2013-Ohio-2335 (Ohio App. 6-6-2013) (plea agreement was violated when defendant not granted drug court, as offered by prosecutor as a plea inducement)
27. State v. Washington, Iowa Supreme Court (6/7/2013), (When the district court asks the defendant a question at sentencing and then imposes an adverse sentencing consequence unrelated to any legitimate penological purpose of the inquiry because the defendant invoked his Fifth Amendment rights, the defendant has been improperly penalized.)
28. Missouri v. Frye, 10-444 (U.S. 3-21-2012) (To show prejudice, under Strickland v. Washington, where a plea offer has lapsed or been rejected because of counsel's deficient performance, defendants must demonstrate a reasonable probability both that they would have accepted the more favorable plea offer had they been afforded effective assistance of counsel and that the plea would have been entered without the prosecution's canceling it or the trial court's refusing to accept it, if they had the authority to exercise that discretion under state law.)
29. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. ____, 130 S. Ct. 1473 ( 2010) (not informing defendant of possible deportation consequences is a potential ineffective assistance of counsel issue under Strickland v. Washington)
30. Stearns, T. “Examining the Consequences of a Conviction After Padilla v. Kentucky and State v. Sandoval” SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE, Vol. 9, Issue 2 (2011)
31. People v. Andrews, 2011 NY Slip Op 31216 (NY: Supreme Court 4/21/2011-unpublished) (Padilla not retroactive and defendant not establish that but for counsel’s deficient performance a different result would have occurred)
32. U.S. v. Carrion, 488 F. 2d 12 (1st Cir 1973) (In entering a guilty plea: “The right to an interpreter rests most fundamentally, however, on the notion that no defendant should face the Kafkaesque spectre of an incomprehensible ritual which may terminate in punishment”)
33. Maxwell Alan Miller, et al., Finding Justice in Translation: American Jurisprudence Affecting Due Process for People With Limited English Proficiency Together With Practical Suggestions, 14 Harv. Latino L. Rev. 117 (2011)
34. John A. Martin, et al., What Does the Intersection of Language, Culture, and Immigration Status Mean for Limited English Proficiency Assistance in the State Courts?, Center for Public Policy Studies (Oct. 2012)
35. Zumberge v. State, 236 P. 3d 1028 (Wyo. 2020) (Court must accommodate hearing impairment where brought to attention of the court or obvious.)
36. People v. Huggins, (not published)  (Calif. 4th App. Dist. 9/30/11) (Defendant waived the benefits of Prop. 36 by his guilty plea and waived incarceration credits received for sanction as deduction from his sentence upon revocation)
37. People v. Barker, ___P. 3d__, (Court of Appeals of California, First District) (August 31, 2011). (not selected for publication) (The record clearly establishes that a condition of Barker's felony probation was participation in drug treatment as ordered by the probation department, regardless of whether this was also a condition of diversion in his separate misdemeanor case or cases. Thus, the time Barker spent in treatment as a condition of his probation in this felony case qualified for credit against his felony sentence unless that credit is otherwise prohibited.)
38. State v. Drum, 225 P.3d 237, 237 (Wash. 2010) (holding that a drug court contract was not equivalent to a guilty plea, but more akin to a deferred prosecution, and that a court must still make a determination of the legal sufficiency of the evidence to convict, irrespective of stipulation by the parties)
39. State v. Dimaggio, No. 2011-156, Supreme Court of New Hampshire (April 10, 2012) (drug court program was neither a day reporting center nor home confinement –therefore defendant not entitled to credit for all time in drug ct program, although he was entitled to jail days imposed as sanctions for non-compliance)
40. House v. State, 901 N.E.2d 598 (Ind. Ct. App. Feb. 2, 2009) (defendant may waive the right to credit time as part of a written drug court agreement)
41. People v. Black, 176 Cal. App. 4th 145 (2009) (holding that the defendant waived pre drug court incarceration credit to enter drug court program)
42. Commonwealth v. Fowler, 930 A.2d 586, 586 (Pa. 2007) (holding that because defendant voluntarily entered program, he was not entitled to pre-sentence credit for time spent in inpatient program)
43. Commonwealth v. Gaddie, 239 S.W.3d 59, 59 (Ky. 2007) (holding that the court did not have jurisdiction to increase suspended sentence from 180 days to 1 year, even though the defendant agreed to modification in order to enter drug court)
44. Laxton v. State, 256 S.W. 3d 518, 518 (Ark. Ct. App. 2007) (holding that drug court participant was not entitled to “sanction” jail time as credit because such credit was not included in the contract)
45. Louis v. State, 994 So.2d 1190, 1190 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (determining whether there was ineffective assistance of counsel for not advising client of drug court)
46. People v. Conway, 845 N.Y.S.2d 545, 545 (N.Y. App. Div. 2007) (addressing the waiver of appeal).
47. People v. Byrnes, 813 N.Y.S. 2d 924, 924 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006) (waiver of right to appeal)
48. State v. Colquitt, 137 P. 3d 892, 892 (Wash. Ct. App. 2006) (in a stipulated fact trial, prosecution must still prove the charged elements beyond a reasonable doubt)
49. State v. Jones, 131 Wash. App. 1021, 1021 (Wash. Ct. App. 2006) (addressing a search waiver)
50. State v. Melick, 129 P.3d 816, 816 (Wash. Ct. App. 2006)(waiver that permitted a stipulated fact trial)
51. Wilkinson v. State, 641 S.E.2d 189, 189 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006). (As part of her drug court contract the defendant waived her ability to contest a search and move for recusal of the drug court judge.)
52. People v. Anderson, 833 N.E.2d 390, 394-95 (Ill. App. 2005) (defendant agreed not only to the substance of the evidence but to its sufficiency as well. Because a stipulation to the sufficiency of the evidence is tantamount to a guilty plea and the defendant needed to be properly advised)
53. State v. Bellville, 705 N.W.2d 506, 506 (Iowa Ct. App. 2005) (holding that the defendant must know he has the right and is surrendering the right to appeal before it can be said that he waived the right to appeal)
54. Wall v. State, No. 212, 2005 Del. LEXIS 17 (Del. 2005) (waiver of right to appeal)
55.  Smith v. State, 840 So.2d 404, 404 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 2003) (ineffective assistance of counsel not to inform defendant of drug court as an option)
56. Adams v. Peterson, 968 F.2d 835, 835 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that a showing of a knowing, voluntary and intelligent waiver must be present and that the full Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 238 (1969) inquiry is not necessary to implement waivers to a stipulated fact trial)

1. Mollica v. State, Alaska: Court of Appeals, No. A-13046, No 2711, 2021. How much process is due to a participant facing termination from a therapeutic court program? The Supreme Court emphasized in Morrissey, the requirements of due process are flexible, and "not all situations calling for procedural safeguards call for the same kind of procedure." Because parole and probation revocations are not part of a criminal prosecution, the full panoply of rights due to a defendant in a criminal proceeding does not apply. Instead, the procedures can be more flexible and informal thanwould occur at a criminal trial. Ultimately, the due process protections recognized in Morrissey and Gagnon include: (1) written notice of the claimed violations; (2) disclosure to the parolee/probationer of the evidence against them; (3) the opportunity to be heard in person and to present witnesses and documentary evidence; (4) the right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses (unless the hearing officer specifically finds good cause for not allowing confrontation); (5) an independent decisionmaker; and (6) a record by the factfinder as to the evidence relied on and the reasons for revoking parole or probation. https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=5523834375575505535&hl=en&lr=lang_en&as_sdt=6,26&as_vis=1&oi=scholaralrt&hist=EeTDlxYAAAAJ:17505535484111283384:AAGBfm2T61kvIBCsbo-b-guG5z6H3J-wDA&html=&folt=kw
2. State v. Cox, Neb: Court of Appeals, 2021 (not published) (Although drug court participant is entitled to same procedural protections in a drug court termination hearing afforded to a probationer is a probation revocation hearing, no due process violations here.) https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=14414958042588190823&q=%22Travis+E.+Cox%22&hl=en&as_sdt=4006
3. State v. Seaman, 947 NW 2d 589 - Neb: Court of Appeals 2020 (defendant accorded full due process rights at termination hearing) https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=3803553311733197242&q=%22drug+court%22&hl=en&scisbd=2&as_sdt=4006&as_ylo=2020&as_yhi=2020 Gaither v. State, 296 So. 3d 553 (Fla. 5th DCA 2020)
4.  Gaither v. State of Florida, ___So. 3d ___, 5D19-534 (5^th DCA 5/15/2020) (A defendant participating in drug court pursuant to a plea agreement is entitled to the same due process as a probationer, before being terminated from the drug court program—citing the NDCI Judicial Benchbook and other authority)
5. State v. Wolf, Unpublished, (Wash: Court of Appeals, 3rd Div. 2/11/2020) (Appellate court rejects a host of claimed due process errors, including staffing issues)
6. Holsapple v. State, (Ind: Court of Appeals 5/6/2020) (upon termination from drug court/mental health court, trial court the trial court was not obligated to impose the sanction stated in a strict liability plea agreement between the State and Holsapple upon finding a violation. The court could impose any consequence permitted by law.)
7. State v. Cantrell, 2019 Ohio 4718 (Ohio: Court of Appeals, 3rd Appellate Dist. 2019) (Court was authorized to revoke defendant’s probation because defendant’s conduct in providing drugs to other drug court participants was not mere technical violation.)
8. State v. Noonan, 2019 Ohio 2960 (Ohio: Court of Appeals, 12th Appellate Dist. 2019) (termination from community corrections sentence and sentence to incarceration improper,  where defendant’s noncompliance due to medical condition beyond her control, thus involuntary.)
9. State v. Echols, Wash: Court of Appeals, (1st Div. 2020 Not selected) (indictment alone insufficient to establish violation of drug court rules by a preponderance of the evidence)
10. Bass v. State, 2019 Ark. App. 407 (Ark: Court of Appeals, 4th Div. 2019) (defendant had full opportunity to litigate the three strikes which formed the basis of his revocation, thus no due process violation)
11. Meeks v. State, (Ind: Court of Appeals 3/29/2019) (defendant’s due process rights were not violated in termination from drug court when she was given notice that she had violated drug court rules generally and her counsel had sufficient information about the evidence against the client, as demonstrated by the record.)
12. Cripe v. State, Ind: Court of Appeals 9/7/2018(not selected) (defendants due process rights not violated when he was terminated from drug court)
13. State v. Cabe, (Wash: Court of Appeals, 2nd Div. 2018) Not selected for publication (when defendant is terminated from drug court and sentenced, the refusal to consider a sentencing alternative is an abuse of discretion.  As stated in State v. Grayson, 154 Wn.2d 333, 342, 111 P.3d 1183 (2005)"where a defendant has requested a sentencing alternative authorized by statute, the categorical refusal to consider the sentence, or the refusal to consider it for a class of offenders, is effectively a failure to exercise discretion and is subject to reversal.")
14. People v. Dowd, Cal: Court of Appeal, (4th Appellate Dist., 2nd Div. 2018) Not selected for publication (pre hearing waiver of probation revocation hearing upon entry into drug court did not violate due process if waiver was knowing, voluntary and intelligently given.)
15. Tsai, Evan C. (2017) "The Practitioner’s Guide to Due Process Issues in Veterans Treatment Courts," Mitchell Hamline Law Review: Vol.43 : Iss. 3 , Article 4.
16. State v. Estes, Not Selected for Publication,  ___ P. 3d ___, (Idaho Court of Appeals  12/14/17) (Because defendant was on regular probation, not a diversionary after plea, he did not have the same due process rights on termination from mental health court, but did have full due process rights on petition to revoke probation.  His liberty interest was in remaining on probation, not remaining in drug court.)
17. Washington v. Commonwealth,  (Va. Court of Appeals 11/14/2017) (Appellant did not prove a Fourteenth Amendment due process violation that occurred in the drug treatment court and entitled him to relief in the circuit court revocation proceeding.  Additionally, the appellant received his due process rights to notice and a hearing in the circuit court revocation proceeding regarding his earlier termination from the drug treatment court program. Finally, to the extent that the appellant may have been able to assert an entitlement to more process in the circuit court revocation proceeding, he failed to make a contemporaneous objection that the level of process he received in that proceeding was insufficient.)
    
18. State v. Barraza, ____ P.3d ___ (NM Court of Appeals 2017) (defendant received sufficient due process protections in her termination from drug court and the judge was not required to recuse)
19. Neal v. State, 2016 Ark. 287 (Ark.  Sup. Ct. 6/30/16) (Citing Laplaca and Staley, infra , Ark. Sup. Ct. holds: “[T]he right to minimum due process before a defendant can be expelled from a drug-court program is so fundamental that it cannot be waived by the defendant in advance of the allegations prompting the removal from the program.”)
20. Idaho v. Keene, 2016 Unpublished Opinion 595 (Ida. App 7/13/16) (Much like probation revocation, it is appropriate for the drug court to consider a multitude of factors in making its discharge determination; thus, it was appropriate to consider Keene's lack of progress and honesty issues in deciding to discharge Keene from drug court. See Upton, 127 Idaho at 275, 899 P.2d at 985. As such, there was no due process violation that occurred in Keene's discharge from drug court.)
21. People v. Shipp, 2016 NY Slip Op 3304 (NY: Appellate Div., 4th Dept. 2016)  (Inasmuch as defendant's failure to appear in court after his termination from drug treatment "constituted a proper basis for the court's finding of noncompliance, it was unnecessary for the court to inquire into defendant's complaints about the suitability of the [treatment] program and the circumstances of his termination)
22. State v. Kelifa, Not Selected for Publication (Wash. App., 2015) (Court rejects arguments that closed drug court staffing meetings preceding his termination violated constitutional rights to a public trial and to be present at all critical stages of a prosecution citing State v. Sykes, 182 Wn.2d 168, 339 P.3d 972 (2014))
23. State v. Mayfield (Iowa App., 2015) (defendant’s assertion that counsel’s failure to require record stated an ineffective assistance claim under Strickland.)
24. Parsons v. McCann,  (D. Neb. 2015) (Court denies in part 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action stemming from plaintiff Dakota Parsons' 29-week stay in the Douglas County Corrections Center while he was a participant in Young Adult Court, allegedly without a probable cause hearing, without being charged with an offense, and without the opportunity to be released on bond.)
25. State v. LeClech, Washington Court of Appeals, NOT SELECTED (6/15/15)  (Where defendant asserted due process violation for not being permitted  to be present at staffing, Appellate court rejected assertion finding he had waived right to be present and further noted: The Washington and United States Constitution guarantee a criminal defendant's `fundamental right to be present at all critical stages of a trial.'" Washington courts analyze alleged violations of a defendant's right to be present by applying federal due process jurisprudence. This court reviews de novo a claimed violation of the right to be present.A defendant's right to be present at a proceeding is required "whenever his presence has a relation, reasonably substantial, to the fullness of his opportunity to defend against the charge.'"  However, this right is not absolute. "`[T]he presence of a defendant is a condition of due process to the extent that a fair and just hearing would be thwarted by his absence.” Thus, the right is not triggered when a defendant's "`presence would be useless, or the benefit but a shadow.'….Just as closed staffings are critical to the success of drug court in the context of public trial rights, the presence of the defendant at staffings would frustrate the collaborative purpose of drug court. In this setting, LeClech does not establish a violation of his right to be present.)
26. State v. Snow, Not Selected for Publication, 32144-4-III (Wash. App. 12-9-2014) (defendant’s due process rights were not violated during termination procedure, including relying on reports reflecting dilute drug samples, particularly where he did not contest testing result)
27. Tate v. State, 2013 OK CR 18, 313 P.3d 274 (2013) (We find that this due process guarantee is also applicable to mental health court termination proceedings. Therefore, a mental health court participant must be sufficiently apprised as to the evidence and the grounds upon which his or her participation in the mental health court is terminated. See Hogar, 1999 OK CR 35, 990 P.2d at 899 (applying this same rule to drug court termination proceedings).
28. Sonnier v. State, 334 P. 3d 948 (Okla. Court of Criminal Appeals 2014) (This Court has held that a defendant who is terminated from participating in a diversionary program is entitled to due process)
29. State v. Kong, 315 P.3d 720 (Haw. 2013) (Defendant’s self-termination from drug court was voluntary)
30. State v. Workman, 22 Neb. App. 223 (2014) (The minimal due process to which a parolee or probationer is entitled also applies to participants in the drug court program. This minimal due process includes (1) written notice of the time and place of the hearing; (2) disclosure of evidence; (3) a neutral fact finding body or person, who should not be the officer directly involved in making recommendations; (4) opportunity to be heard in person and to present witnesses and documentary evidence; (5) the right to cross-examine adverse witnesses, unless the hearing officer determines that an informant would be subjected to risk of harm if his or her identity were disclosed or unless the officer otherwise specifically finds good cause for not allowing confrontation; and (6) a written statement by the fact finder as to the evidence relied on and the reasons for revoking the conditional liberty.  The standard of proof for termination from drug court participation is preponderance of the evidence.)
31. State v. Bishop, 429 N.J. Super. 533 (2013), affirmed, per curiam, 10/21/15, (Recognizing that both drug court and traditional court defendants should be similarly treated upon probation revocation, the court said: “The carrot-and-stick approach is integral to the Drug Court concept. Prison-bound offenders are given an opportunity to be diverted from a state prison sentence if they are willing to avail themselves of the rehabilitative opportunities available in Drug Court in an effort to free themselves from the recurring cycle of drug dependency and criminal activity. The legislative history of the 1999 amendments includes the Report to the Governor by the Attorney General on the Need to Update the Comprehensive Drug Reform Act of 1987, December 9, 1996. That document "call[ed] for new ways to support drug court programs. One way is to provide judges with new legal tools with which to 'leverage' addicts into treatment." Id. at 18 (emphasis added). The legislation that followed created special probation, as distinguished from regular probation, and established the new resentencing provision applicable upon revocation of special probation……. The ultimate motivation or leverage, a tool needed to enable Drug Courts to operate effectively, is the threat of the substantial sentence that would have been imposed originally if the defendant were not admitted to Drug Court through special probation.”)
32. Tennessee v. Creech, Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee, at Nashville. Filed April 26, 2013. (any unilateral termination from drug court was harmless in light of full blown evidentiary hearing on probation revocation)
33. Gibson v. Kentucky, No. 2011-CA-001368-MR.,Court of Appeals of Kentucky, Rendered: January 18, 2013. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED (Finding that the defendant was accorded due process in his termination form drug court, the appellate court observed the following to be a proper trial court consideration in termination: “Gibson's unwillingness or inability to adopt basic tenants of Drug Court, such as honesty, constituted continued "addict thinking" and reflected negatively on Gibson's ability to remain compliant and crime-free within the community.”
34. Gross v. State of Maine, Superior Court case # CR-11-4805 (2/26/13)(drug court procedures relating to termination violative of due process and, therefore, unconstitutional.  Drug Court participant entitled to: notice of the termination allegations and the evidence against him, right to call and x-examine witnesses, a hearing at which he is present, a neutral magistrate, written factual findings and the right to counsel.  Here, the drug court team discussed the termination decision during the termination hearing, without defendant’s presence or that of his counsel.  That procedure coupled by the fact the Superior Court felt that the drug court judge should have recused, resulted in a finding of constitutional infirmity.  Moreover, the appellate court ruled the defendant did not, arguably could not prospectively waive his rights, citing LaPlaca and Staley.
35. People v. Woodall, D062005 (Cal. App. 6-3-2013)(defendant not per se entitled to an arrest warrant/sworn affidavit for a probation violation-the touchstone being reasonableness, nor is defendant entitled to a PC determination on a probation revocation proceeding unless he will be incarcerated for some lengthy time before a hearing.)
36. Arizona v. Tatlow, No. 1 CA-CR 11-0593, Court of Appeals of Arizona, Division One, Department C. (December 4, 2012) (no Federal Confidentiality Law, 42 CFR, part 2 violation for judge to take judicial notice of violations of treatment obligations at probation revocation hearing)
37. Arizona v. Perez Cano, No. 1 CA-CR 11-0473 Court of Appeals of Arizona (September 20, 2012) UNPUBLISHED (Defendant did not prove drug court termination hearing violated Federal Confidentiality Law and judge was not required to recuse)
38. Grayson v. Kentucky, No. 2011-CA-000399-MR. Court of Appeals  of Kentucky UNPUBLISHED ( June 29, 2012) (defendant not denied due process in drug court termination hearing because she received notice of the evidence against her and judge not required to recuse.)
39. Tornavacca v. State, 2012 Ark. 224 (2012) (Although the majority finds that defendant’s due process rights were not violated during his drug court termination hearing, the dissent finds that status hearing where the initial decision was made to remove defendant  from drug court violated his due process rights because he did not get to contest the allegations then although he was represented by counsel and a termination hearing 4 months later did not cure the due process violation)
40. People v. Freeman, No. E052780, Court of Appeals of California, Fourth District, Division Two, UNPUBLISHED (1/23/12) (Defendant surrendered his right to a drug court termination hearing in his drug court contract and waived his right to have a record of drug court proceedings and the presumption of proper proceedings was not overcome, therefore defendants termination and sentence was upheld.)
41. State v. LaPlaca, 27 A.3d 719 (New Hampshire 2011)  (Even where program manual provided: “Any violation of the terms and conditions of the [Program] shall result in the imposition of sanctions, without hearing, by the court as deemed fair and appropriate, consistent with statutory authority and the descriptions as outlined in the [Program] policy manual. The defendant waives any right(s) to any and all hearings. Termination of participation in the [Program] shall result in the imposition of the suspended prison sentences and fines without hearing. The defendant shall affirmatively waive any and all rights to a hearing”, waiver pre-notice of allegations was not enforceable. Court relied upon Staley v. State, 851 So.2d 805 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003)   Failure to provide the participant a pre termination hearing was a violation of due process in the context of removal from drug court and imposition of a suspended sentence. The court left for another day whether such pre hearing waiver was valid for the drug court sanctioning process)
42. People v. Sharrieff, No. E052552.Court of Appeals of California, Fourth District, Division Two. Filed April 30, 2013. NOT SELECTED FOR PUBLICATION, (defendant may prospectively waive right to probation revocation hearing)
43. State v. Shambley, 281 Neb. 317 (2011) (Drug court program participants are entitled to the same due process protections as persons facing termination of parole or probation.)
44. Bonn v. Commonwealth, No. 2009-CA-002304-MR. (Court of Appeals of Kentucky. May 6, 2011) UNPUBLISHED (Defendant not entitled to continuance of drug court termination hearing to obtain an expert who could testify that defendant’s 3 positive drug tests were due to sexual contact with cocaine users and sweat from barbershop customers)
45. People v. Fiammegta, 14 N.Y.3d 90, 923 N.E.2d 1123 (2010) (where defendant was under suspended sentence on condition of completion of treatment program and he is discharged based upon alleged criminal activity, the court “was not required to conduct an evidentiary hearing in this case, or to determine by a preponderance of the evidence that defendant was guilty of the thefts of which he was accused. But the judge should have considered defendant's argument that he was kicked out of the program based on thin evidence of wrongdoing after inadequate investigation; and he should have allowed defendant to submit letters and testimony or affidavits from his mother and girlfriend about the money they claimed to have sent him.”)
46. Gosha v. State, 927 N.E.2d 942, 942 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (Court explained that termination from drug court requires the written notice of the claimed violations, the disclosure of the evidence against the defendant, the opportunity to be heard and present evidence, the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses, and a neutral and detached judicial officer)
47. Harris v. Commonwealth, 689 S.E.2d 713 (Va. 2010) (participation in drug court implicates a due process liberty interest and at termination and ultimate sentencing defendant has a right to be heard)
48. People v. Kimmel, 24 Misc.3d 1052, 882 N.Y.S.2d 895 (2009) (not selected for official publication)  (holding that defendant not entitled to a hearing per se, but was entitled to make a statement and have counsel present-- relying upon Torres v. Berbary, 340 F. 3d 63, 63 (2d Cir. 2003)).
49. State v. Perkins, 661 S.E. 2d 366, 366 (S.C. Ct. App. 2008) (holding that termination decision not reviewable, but defendant entitled to notice and hearing on whether defendant violated conditions of his suspended sentence by being terminated from drug court).
50. Lawson v. State, 969 So.2d 222, 222 (Fla. 2007) (holding that the right to receive adequate notice of the conditions of probation is in part realized through the requirement that a violation be substantial and willful, however, the court need not define how many violations it will take to constitute a willful violation)
51. State v. Rogers, 170 P. 3d 881, 881 (Idaho 2007) (holding that termination hearings required in drug courts, at least where defendant pled guilty and sentence deferred, reversing Court of Appeals decision that held that due process concerns were met by terms of drug court contract)
52. State v. Varnell, 155 P.3d 971, 971 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007) (defendant had unilateral right to terminate from drug court by contract, so no hearing required when defendant requests to terminate other than his request before the court to terminate)
53. People v. Anderson, 833 N.E.2d 390, 390 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005) (holding that drug court termination in a diversion court requires a hearing)
54. State v. Cassill-Skilton, 94 P.3d 407, 410 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004) (defendant entitled to a hearing when state moves to terminate.)
55. Staley v. State, 851 So.2d 805 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (purported waiver of right to adversarial hearing at termination in drug court contract violated due process)
56. People v. Woods, 748 N.Y.S.2d 222, 222 (2002) (holding that the defendant was not entitled to a hearing, but noting every review was a hearing in which the defendant had an opportunity to participate.)

Hagar v. State, 990 P.2d 894, 899 (Okla. Crim. App. 1999) (defendant was statutorily entitled to notice of the grounds for termination)

1. State v. Watson, No. M2015-00108-CCA-R3-CD., (Tenn. Court of Criminal Appeals 2016)  Drug court judge’s decision to leave the termination decision to team was an abdication of responsibility and a violation of due process Citing Tennessee v. Stewart,   No. M2008-00474-CCA-R3-CD Filed  October 6, 2008 Unpublished Opinion)
2. PEOPLE, IN INTEREST OF AKA-C., 2017 SD 38 (South Dakota Supreme Court 2017) (in termination hearing, Court did not improperly consider evidence adduced in mother’s drug court status hearings in violation of statute)
3. Maggard v. Commonwealth , Not Selected for Publication  , (Ky. App., 2015)(no due process violation when defendant terminated from drug court based upon certification of violations, prepared by a drug court employee, alleging Maggard had absconded from the Fayette County Drug Court Program; had dirty and/or diluted urine screens on four dates; six missed urine screens; and four other events of note: not having a meeting sheet; missing curfew; dishonesty-not maintaining employment; and her inability to produce a sample.  Defendant had a hearing and had the ability to call witnesses.  The fact that the court relied on hearsay did not constitute a due process violation citing US Supreme Court cases Morrissey and Gagnon.)
4. State v. Tiedeken, Not Selected for Publication  (N.J. Super. App. Div., 2015) (the New Jersey  Drug Court Manual is recognized as an authoritative source for the operation of the Drug Court program. State v. Meyer, 192 N.J. 421, 431 (2007) )
5. Withers v. State, 48A02-1403-CR-130 (Ind. App. 8-26-2014)(drug court did not violate due process by taking judicial notice of  its own records including mental health treatment records in drug court revocation proceeding)
6. State v. Nichelin, 181 Wn. App. 1024 (2014)( Because the record demonstrates that the trial court had ample basis to find that Kratom is a mood-altering substance by a preponderance of the evidence presented at the hearing, and because the trial court explicitly relied on that evidence, Nichelin fails to establish a violation of his right to due process.)
7. Gibson v. Kentucky, No. 2011-CA-001368-MR.,Court of Appeals of Kentucky, Rendered: January 18, 2013.NOT TO BE PUBLISHED (Finding that the defendant was accorded due process in his termination from drug court, the appellate court observed the following to be a proper trial court consideration in termination: “Gibson's unwillingness or inability to adopt basic tenants of Drug Court, such as honesty, constituted continued "addict thinking" and reflected negatively on Gibson's ability to remain compliant and crime-free within the community.”
8. Butler v. Indiana, No. 34A05-1109-CR-447 (Unpublished 4/11/12) (Evidentiary proof at drug court termination did not constitute due process violation.)
9. Tennessee v. Stewart,   No. M2008-00474-CCA-R3-CD - Filed October 6, 2008 Unpublished Opinion (Drug court judge’s decision to leave the termination decision to team was an abdication of responsibility and a violation of due process)
10. People v. Joseph, 785 N.Y.S.2d 292, 291 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2004) (In an appeal involving a drug court, a five part test was adopted to determine whether the evidence supporting termination from a treatment program was sufficiently reliable to meet due process requirements adopting Torres v. Berbary, 340 F.3d 63, 63 (2d Cir. 2003))
11. State v. Johnson, 679 N.W.2d 169, 174 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004) (rules of evidence do not apply to probation revocation hearing)
12. State v. Foster, 782 A.2d 98, 98 (Conn. 2001) (4th Amendment not apply to probation revocation proceedings)
13. State v. Scarlet, 800 So.2d 220, 222 (Fla. 2001) (4th Amendment exclusionary rule applies at probation revocation proceeding)
14. United States v. Gravina, 906 F. Supp. 50, 53-54 (D. Mass. 1995) (4th Amendment not apply to probation revocation proceedings)
15. People v. Harrison, 771 P.2d 23, 23 (Colo. Ct. App. 1989)  (court explained that the standard of proof is preponderance of the evidence, unless there is an allegation of a new crime.. If there is an allegation of a new crime, and the defendant has not been convicted, the standard of proof is beyond a reasonable doubt.)
16. Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 426-436 (1985) (Fifth Amendment not apply to probation revocation proceedings)
17. United States v. Mackinzie, 601 F.2d 221, 221 (5th Cir. 1979)(Miranda not apply to probation revocation proceedings)

State v. Cox, Neb: Court of Appeals, 2021 (not published) (Although drug court participant is entitled to same procedural protections in a drug court termination hearing afforded to a probationer is a probation revocation hearing, no due process violations here.)

https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=14414958042588190823&q=%22Travis+E.+Cox%22&hl=en&as_sdt=4006

State v. Seaman, 947 NW 2d 589 - Neb: Court of Appeals 2020 (defendant accorded full due process rights at termination hearing)

https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=3803553311733197242&q=%22drug+court%22&hl=en&scisbd=2&as_sdt=4006&as_ylo=2020&as_yhi=2020

Gaither v. State, 296 So. 3d 553 (Fla. 5th DCA 2020) (A defendant participating in drug court pursuant to a plea agreement is entitled to the same due process as a probationer, before being terminated from the drug court program—citing the NDCI Judicial Benchbook and other authority)

https://www.5dca.org/content/download/635553/7221180/file/190534_DC13_05152020_082649_i.pdf

State v. Wolf, Unpublished, (Wash: Court of Appeals, 3rd Div. 2/11/2020) (Appellate court rejects a host of claimed due process errors, including staffing issues)

https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=14202085449744082195&q=%22drug+court%22&hl=en&scisbd=2&as_sdt=4006

Holsapple v. State, 148 N.E.3d 1035 (Ind: Court of Appeals 5/6/2020) (upon termination from drug court/mental health court, trial court the trial court was not obligated to impose the sanction stated in a strict liability plea agreement between the State and Holsapple upon finding a violation.  The court could impose any consequence permitted by law.)

https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=868646873012211738&q=%22drug+court%22&hl=en&scisbd=2&as_sdt=4006&as_ylo=2019  ---compare with Mefford v. State, 165 NE 3d 571 (Ind. App. 2021) (Different result where there is a deferral of sentence and placement into drug court.)  https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=10244891082594020798&q=%22drug+court%22&hl=en&scisbd=2&as_sdt=6,44&as_ylo=2020

State v. Cantrell, 2019 Ohio 4718 (Ohio: Court of Appeals, 3rd Appellate Dist. 2019) (Court was authorized to revoke defendant’s probation because defendant’s conduct in providing drugs to other drug court participants was not mere technical violation.)

https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=18055001074397005445&q=%22drug+court%22&hl=en&scisbd=2&as_sdt=4006

State v. Noonan, 2019 Ohio 2960 (Ohio: Court of Appeals, 12th Appellate Dist. 2019) (termination from community corrections sentence and sentence to incarceration improper,  where defendant’s noncompliance due to medical condition beyond her control, thus involuntary.)

https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=3087318601239362309&q=%22drug+court%22&hl=en&scisbd=2&as_sdt=4006

State v. Echols, Wash: Court of Appeals, (1st Div. 2020 Not selected) (indictment alone insufficient to establish violation of drug court rules by a preponderance of the evidence)

https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=6994260687767122600&q=%22drug+court%22&hl=en&scisbd=2&as_sdt=4006&as_ylo=2019

Bass v. State, 2019 Ark. App. 407 (Ark: Court of Appeals, 4th Div. 2019) (defendant had full opportunity to litigate the three strikes which formed the basis of his revocation, thus no due process violation)

https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=664809626037337250&q=%22drug+court%22&hl=en&scisbd=2&as_sdt=4006

Meeks v. State, (Ind: Court of Appeals 3/29/2019)(defendant’s due process rights were not violated in termination from drug court when she was given notice that she had violated drug court rules generally and her counsel had sufficient information about the evidence against the client, as demonstrated by the record.)

https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=8237358107492591254&hl=en&lr=lang_en&as_sdt=40006&as_vis=1&oi=scholaralrt&hist=f_OieYgAAAAJ:5630771474538523222:AAGBfm0ySInokk

Cripe v. State, Ind: Court of Appeals 9/7/2018(not selected) (defendants due process rights not violated when he was terminated from drug court)

https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=14956039790920732553&hl=en&lr=lang_en&as_sdt=4006&as_vis=1&oi=scholaralrt&hist=f_OieYgAAAAJ:16291440605429870550:AAG

State v. Cabe, (Wash: Court of Appeals, 2nd Div. 2018) Not selected for publication (when defendant is terminated from drug court and sentenced, the refusal to consider a sentencing alternative is an abuse of discretion.  As stated in State v. Grayson, 154 Wn.2d 333, 342, 111 P.3d 1183 (2005)"where a defendant has requested a sentencing alternative authorized by statute, the categorical refusal to consider the sentence, or the refusal to consider it for a class of offenders, is effectively a failure to exercise discretion and is subject to reversal.")

https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=17034070312325974025&q=rachelle&hl=en&as_sdt=4,48&as_ylo=2018

IN THE MATTER OF WEAPONS SEIZED PURSUANT TO PREVENTION OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ACT FROM JS, (NJ: Appellate Div. 2018) (court could not take judicial notice that total abstinence was the policy of drug courts particularly when notice not given to parties of intent to take judicial notice)

https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=1753515070523820052&hl=en&lr=lang_en&as_sdt=40006&as_vis=1&oi=scholaralrt&hist=f_OieYgAAAAJ:5630771474538523222:AAGBfm0ySInokkqZAoN7h1RJzNnSU5OFQg

People v. Dowd, Cal: Court of Appeal, (4th Appellate Dist., 2nd Div. 2018) Not selected for publication (pre hearing waiver of probation revocation hearing upon entry into drug court did not violate due process if waiver was knowing, voluntary and intelligently given.) https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=8247690066289515760&q=dowd&hl=en&as_sdt=4,5&as_ylo=2018

Tsai, Evan C. (2017) "The Practitioner’s Guide to Due Process Issues in VeteransTreatment Courts," Mitchell Hamline Law Review: Vol.43 : Iss. 3 , Article 4.

https://open.mitchellhamline.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1080&context=mhlr

State v. Estes, Not Selected for Publication,  ___ P. 3d ___, (Idaho Court of Appeals  12/14/17) (Because defendant was on regular probation, not a diversionary after plea, he did not have the same due process rights on termination from mental health court, but did have full due process rights on petition to revoke probation.  His liberty interest was in remaining on probation, not remaining in drug court.) https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=12002123547662287229&q=State+v.+Estes&hl=en&as_sdt=4,13&as_ylo=2017

Washington v. Commonwealth,  (Va. Court of Appeals 11/14/2017) (Appellant did not prove a Fourteenth Amendment due process violation that occurred in the drug treatment court and entitled him to relief in the circuit court revocation proceeding.  Additionally, the appellant received his due process rights to notice and a hearing in the circuit court revocation proceeding regarding his earlier termination from the drug treatment court program. Finally, to the extent that the appellant may have been able to assert an entitlement to more process in the circuit court revocation proceeding, he failed to make a contemporaneous objection that the level of process he received in that proceeding was insufficient.)

https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=9683760019348147242&hl=en&lr=lang_en&as_sdt=40006&as_vis=1&oi=scholaralrt

State v. Barraza, ____ P.3d ___ (NM Court of Appeals 2017) (defendant received sufficient due process protections in her termination from drug court and the judge was not required to recuse) https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?about=6563772992073809641&hl=en&lr=lang_en&as_sdt=4006&as_vis=1

Neal v. State, 2016 Ark. 287 (Ark.  Sup. Ct. 6/30/16) (Citing Laplaca and Staley, infra , Ark. Sup. Ct. holds: “[T]he right to minimum due process before a defendant can be expelled from a drug-court program is so fundamental that it cannot be waived by the defendant in advance of the allegations prompting the removal from the program.”)

https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=10248754056601852209&q=neal&hl=en&as_sdt=4,71&as_ylo=2016

Idaho v. Keene, 2016 Unpublished Opinion 595 (Ida. App 7/13/16) (Much like probation revocation, it is appropriate for the drug court to consider a multitude of factors in making its discharge determination; thus, it was appropriate to consider Keene's lack of progress and honesty issues in deciding to discharge Keene from drug court. See Upton, 127 Idaho at 275, 899 P.2d at 985. As such, there was no due process violation that occurred in Keene's discharge from drug court.)

https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=10226041807268465249&q=2016+Unpublished+Opinion+595+&hl=en&as_sdt=4,13&as_ylo=2016

People v. Shipp, 2016 NY Slip Op 3304 (NY: Appellate Div., 4th Dept. 2016)  (Inasmuch as defendant's failure to appear in court after his termination from drug treatment "constituted a proper basis for the court's finding of noncompliance, it was unnecessary for the court to inquire into defendant's complaints about the suitability of the [treatment] program and the circumstances of his termination)

https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=6118356463266500818&q=fiammegta&hl=en&as_sdt=40006

State v. Kelifa, Not Selected for Publication (Wash. App., 2015) (Court rejects arguments that closed drug court staffing meetings preceding his termination violated constitutional rights to a public trial and to be present at all critical stages of a prosecution citing State v. Sykes, 182 Wn.2d 168, 339 P.3d 972 (2014))

https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=8863457670511077816&q=kelifa&hl=en&as_sdt=4,181,247&as_ylo=2015

State v. Mayfield (Iowa App., 2015) (defendant’s assertion that counsel’s failure to require record stated an ineffective assistance claim under Strickland.)

https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=13523461619044045085&q=State+v.+Mayfield+&hl=en&as_sdt=4,181&as_ylo=2015

Parsons v. McCann,  (D. Neb. 2015) (Court denies in part 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action stemming from plaintiff Dakota Parsons' 29-week stay in the Douglas County Corrections Center while he was a participant in Young Adult Court, allegedly without a probable cause hearing, without being charged with an offense, and without the opportunity to be released on bond.)

https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=6547750496671614618&q=Parsons+v.+McCann+(D.+Neb.,+2015)&hl=en&as_sdt=3,15,25,247&as_ylo=201

State v. LeClech, Washington Court of Appeals, NOT SELECTED (6/15/15)  (Where defendant asserted due process violation for not being permitted  to be present at staffing, Appellate court rejected assertion finding he had waived right to be present and further noted: The Washington and United States Constitution guarantee a criminal defendant's `fundamental right to be present at all critical stages of a trial.'" Washington courts analyze alleged violations of a defendant's right to be present by applying federal due process jurisprudence. This court reviews de novo a claimed violation of the right to be present.

A defendant's right to be present at a proceeding is required "whenever his presence has a relation, reasonably substantial, to the fullness of his opportunity to defend against the charge.'"  However, this right is not absolute. "`[T]he presence of a defendant is a condition of due process to the extent that a fair and just hearing would be thwarted by his absence.” Thus, the right is not triggered when a defendant's "`presence would be useless, or the benefit but a shadow.'….Just as closed staffings are critical to the success of drug court in the context of public trial rights, the presence of the defendant at staffings would frustrate the collaborative purpose of drug court. In this setting, LeClech does not establish a violation of his right to be present.)

https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=15552841217808260528&q=state+v.+LeCLECH&hl=en&as_sdt=4006

State v. Snow, Not Selected for Publication, 32144-4-III (Wash. App. 12-9-2014)(defendant’s due process rights were not violated during termination procedure, including relying on reports reflecting dilute drug samples, particularly where he did not contest testing result) http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=12875010920879774023&q=state+v.+snow&hl=en&as_sdt=4,14,247&as_ylo=2014

Tate v. State, 2013 OK CR 18, 313 P.3d 274 (2013) (We find that this due process guarantee is also applicable to mental health court termination proceedings. Therefore, a mental health court participant must be sufficiently apprised as to the evidence and the grounds upon which his or her participation in the mental health court is terminated. See Hogar, 1999 OK CR 35, 990 P.2d at 899 (applying this same rule to drug court termination proceedings). https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=5469050606281120565&q=313+P.3d+274+&hl=en&as_sdt=4006

Sonnier v. State, 334 P. 3d 948 (Okla. Court of Criminal Appeals 2014) (This Court has held that a defendant who is terminated from participating in a diversionary program is entitled to due process) https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=4405251104268084530&q=313+P.3d+274+&hl=en&as_sdt=4006

State v. Kong, 315 P.3d 720 (Haw. 2013) Defendant’s self-termination from drug court was voluntary) http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=3564059598590596309&q=state+v.+kong&hl=en&as_sdt=2006

State v. Workman, 22 Neb. App. 223 (2014) (The minimal due process to which a parolee or probationer is entitled also applies to participants in the drug court program. This minimal due process includes (1) written notice of the time and place of the hearing; (2) disclosure of evidence; (3) a neutral fact finding body or person, who should not be the officer directly involved in making recommendations; (4) opportunity to be heard in person and to present witnesses and documentary evidence; (5) the right to cross-examine adverse witnesses, unless the hearing officer determines that an informant would be subjected to risk of harm if his or her identity were disclosed or unless the officer otherwise specifically finds good cause for not allowing confrontation; and (6) a written statement by the fact finder as to the

evidence relied on and the reasons for revoking the conditional liberty.  The standard of proof for termination from drug court participation is preponderance of the evidence.)

https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=2647688473938243455&q=22+Neb.+App.+223+&hl=en&as_sdt=4006

State v. Bishop, 429 N.J. Super. 533 (2013), affirmed, per curiam , 10/21/15,  (Recognizing that both drug court and traditional court defendants should be similarly treated upon probation revocation, the court said: “The carrot-and-stick approach is integral to the Drug Court concept. Prison-bound offenders are given an opportunity to be diverted from a state prison sentence if they are willing to avail themselves of the rehabilitative opportunities available in Drug Court in an effort to free themselves from the recurring cycle of drug dependency and criminal activity. The legislative history of the 1999 amendments includes the Report to the Governor by the Attorney General on the Need to Update the Comprehensive Drug Reform Act of 1987, December 9, 1996. That document "call[ed] for new ways to support drug court programs. One way is to provide judges with new legal tools with which to 'leverage' addicts into treatment." Id. at 18 (emphasis added). The legislation that followed created special probation, as distinguished from regular probation, and established the new resentencing provision applicable upon revocation of special probation……. The ultimate motivation or leverage, a tool needed to enable Drug Courts to operate effectively, is the threat of the substantial sentence that would have been imposed originally if the defendant were not admitted to Drug Court through special probation.”)

http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=6443566629236988868&q=429+N.J.+Super.+533+&hl=en&as_sdt=4006&as_ylo=2013

Tennessee v. Creech, Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee, at Nashville. Filed April 26, 2013. (any unilateral termination from drug court was harmless in light of full blown evidentiary hearing on probation revocation)

http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=1286223493589291908&q=Tennessee+v.+Creech+&hl=en&as_sdt=4006&as_ylo=2012

Gibson v. Kentucky, No. 2011-CA-001368-MR.,Court of Appeals of Kentucky, Rendered: January 18, 2013. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED (Finding that the defendant was accorded due process in his termination form drug court, the appellate court observed the following to be a proper trial court consideration in termination: “Gibson's unwillingness or inability to adopt basic tenants of Drug Court, such as honesty, constituted continued "addict thinking" and reflected negatively on Gibson's ability to remain compliant and crime-free within the community.”

http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=5659361949627107451&q=No.+2011-CA-001368-MR&hl=en&as_sdt=4006&as_ylo=2013

Gross v. State of Maine, Superior Court case # CR-11-4805 (2/26/13)(drug court procedures relating to termination violative of due process and, therefore, unconstitutional.  Drug Court participant entitled to: notice of the termination allegations and the evidence against him, right to call and x-examine witnesses, a hearing at which he is present, a neutral magistrate, written factual findings and the right to counsel.  Here, the drug court team discussed the termination decision during the termination hearing, without defendant’s presence or that of his counsel.  That procedure coupled by the fact the Superior Court felt that the drug court judge should have recused, resulted in a finding of constitutional infirmity.  Moreover, the appellate court ruled the defendant did not, arguably could not prospectively waive his rights, citing LaPlaca and Staley.

https://docs.google.com/a/jaginc.com/file/d/0B3rjtxVPOqL7a01CeEZPT1RkSFU/edit?pli=1

People v. Woodall, D062005 (Cal. App. 6-3-2013)(defendant not per se entitled to an arrest warrant/sworn affidavit for a probation violation-the touchstone being reasonableness, nor is defendant entitled to a PC determination on a probation revocation proceeding unless he will be incarcerated for some lengthy time before a hearing.)

http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=12495672069753791277&q=PEOPLE+v.+WOODALL,+D062005+&hl=en&as_sdt=4006&as_ylo=2013

Arizona v. Tatlow, No. 1 CA-CR 11-0593, Court of Appeals of Arizona, Division One, Department C. (December 4, 2012) (no Federal Confidentiality Law, 42 CFR, part 2 violation for judge to take judicial notice of violations of treatment obligations at probation revocation hearing)

http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=18145047738948527281&hl=en&lr=lang_en&as_sdt=2,10&as_vis=1&oi=scholaralrt

Arizona v. Perez Cano, No. 1 CA-CR 11-0473 Court of Appeals of Arizona (September 20, 2012) UNPUBLISHED (Defendant did not prove drug court termination hearing violated Federal Confidentiality Law and judge was not required to recuse)

http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=4169971555218744981&q=perez+cano&hl=en&as_sdt=4,67,185&as_ylo=2008

Grayson v. Kentucky, No. 2011-CA-000399-MR. Court of Appeals  of Kentucky UNPUBLISHED ( June 29, 2012) (defendant not denied due process in drug court termination hearing because she received notice of the evidence against her and judge not required to recuse.)

http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=16272897103924913248&q=Grayson+v.+Kentucky&hl=en&as_sdt=4,185&as_ylo=2008

Tornavacca v. State, 2012 Ark. 224 (2012) (Although the majority finds that defendant’s due process rights were not violated during his drug court termination hearing, the dissent finds that status hearing where the initial decision was made to remove defendant from drug court violated his due process rights because he did not get to contest the allegations then although he was represented by counsel and a termination hearing 4 months later did not cure the due process violation)

http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=5259011488869936538&q=tornavacca&hl=en&as_sdt=2,6&as_ylo=2011

People v. Freeman, No. E052780, Court of Appeals of California, Fourth District, Division Two, UNPUBLISHED (1/23/12) (Defendant surrendered his right to a drug court termination hearing in his drug court contract and waived his right to have a record of drug court proceedings and the presumption of proper proceedings was not overcome, therefore defendants termination and sentence was upheld.)

http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=11586198439532533891&q=people+v.+freeman&hl=en&as_sdt=2,6&as_ylo=2011

State v. LaPlaca, 27 A.3d 719 (New Hampshire 2011)  (Even where program manual provided: “Any violation of the terms and conditions of the [Program] shall result in the imposition of sanctions, without hearing, by the court as deemed fair and appropriate, consistent with statutory authority and the descriptions as outlined in the [Program] policy manual. The defendant waives any right(s) to any and all hearings. Termination of participation in the [Program] shall result in the imposition of the suspended prison sentences and fines without hearing. The defendant shall affirmatively waive any and all rights to a hearing”, waiver pre-notice of allegations was not enforceable. Court relied upon Staley v. State, 851 So.2d 805 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003)   Failure to provide the participant a pre termination hearing was a violation of due process in the context of removal from drug court and imposition of a suspended sentence. The court left for another day whether such pre hearing waiver was valid for the drug court sanctioning process)

http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=8615789828453592685&q=state+v.+laplaca&hl=en&as_sdt=4006&as_ylo=2010

People v. Sharrieff, No. E052552.Court of Appeals of California, Fourth District, Division Two. Filed April 30, 2013. NOT SELECTED FOR PUBLICATION, (defendant may prospectively waive right to probation revocation hearing) http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=14908880073895063144&q=People+v.+Sharrieff&hl=en&as_sdt=4006

State v. Shambley, 281 Neb. 317 (2011) (Drug court program participants are entitled to the same due process protections as persons facing termination of parole or probation.)

https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=6580022467069018400&q=281+neb+317&hl=en&as_sdt=4006

Bonn v. Commonwealth, No. 2009-CA-002304-MR. (Court of Appeals of Kentucky.

May 6, 2011) UNPUBLISHED (Defendant not entitled to continuance of drug court termination hearing to obtain an expert who could testify that defendant’s 3 positive drug tests were due to sexual contact with cocaine users and sweat from barbershop customers)

http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=14593808404681940420&q=bonn+v.+commonwealth&hl=en&as_sdt=2,6&as_ylo=2010

People v. Fiammegta, 14 N.Y.3d 90, 923 N.E.2d 1123 (2010) (where defendant was under suspended sentence on condition of completion of treatment program and he is discharged based upon alleged criminal activity, the court “was not required to conduct an evidentiary hearing in this case, or to determine by a preponderance of the evidence that defendant was guilty of the thefts of which he was accused. But the judge should have considered defendant's argument that he was kicked out of the program based on thin evidence of wrongdoing after inadequate investigation; and he should have allowed defendant to submit letters and testimony or affidavits from his mother and girlfriend about the money they claimed to have sent him.”)

http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=13711217569628627099&q=fiammegta&hl=en&as_sdt=2,10

Gosha v. State, 927 N.E.2d 942, 942 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (Court explained that termination from drug court requires the written notice of the claimed violations, the disclosure of the evidence against the defendant, the opportunity to be heard and present evidence, the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses, and a neutral and detached judicial officer)

http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=12877292895770376697&q=927+N.E.2d+942&hl=en&as_sdt=2,6

Harris v. Commonwealth, 689 S.E.2d 713 (Va. 2010) (participation in drug court implicates a due process liberty interest and at termination and ultimate sentencing defendant has a right to be heard)

http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=10155157023036820145&q=689+S.E.2d+713&hl=en&as_sdt=2,6

People v. Kimmel, 24 Misc.3d 1052, 882 N.Y.S.2d 895 (2009) (holding that defendant not entitled to a hearing per se, but was entitled to make a statement and have counsel present-- relying upon Torres v. Berbary, 340 F. 3d 63, 63 (2d Cir. 2003)).

http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=15816833655240312621&q=882+N.Y.S.2d+895&hl=en&as_sdt=2,6

State v. Perkins, 661 S.E. 2d 366, 366 (S.C. Ct. App. 2008) (holding that termination decision not reviewable, but defendant entitled to notice and hearing on whether defendant violated conditions of his suspended sentence by being terminated from drug court).

http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=15246391932440507513&q=661+S.E.+2d+366&hl=en&as_sdt=2,6

Lawson v. State, 969 So.2d 222, 222 (Fla. 2007) (holding that the right to receive adequate notice of the conditions of probation is in part realized through the requirement that a violation be substantial and willful, however, the court need not define how many violations it will take to constitute a willful violation)

http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=16906687627413927846&q=969+So.2d+222&hl=en&as_sdt=2,6

State v. Rogers, 170 P. 3d 881, 881 (Idaho 2007) (holding that termination hearings required in drug courts, at least where defendant pled guilty and sentence deferred, reversing Court of Appeals decision that held that due process concerns were met by terms of drug court contract)

http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=2322361691501274822&q=170+P.+3d+881&hl=en&as_sdt=2,6

State v. Varnell, 155 P.3d 971, 971 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007) (defendant had unilateral right to terminate from drug court by contract, so no hearing required when defendant requests to terminate other than his request before the court to terminate)

http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=11035032696909714921&q=155+P.3d+971&hl=en&as_sdt=2,6

People v. Anderson, 833 N.E.2d 390, 390 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005) (holding that drug court termination in a diversion court requires a hearing)

http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=12870013841436880117&q=833+N.E.2d+390&hl=en&as_sdt=2,6

State v. Cassill-Skilton, 94 P.3d 407, 410 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004) (defendant entitled to a hearing when state moves to terminate.)

http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=5425208029734396745&q=94+P.3d+407&hl=en&as_sdt=2,6

Staley v. State, 851 So.2d 805 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (purported waiver of right to adversarial hearing at termination in drug court contract violated due process)

http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=8592482668417733210&q=851+So.2d+805+&hl=en&as_sdt=2,6

People v. Woods, 748 N.Y.S.2d 222, 222 (2002) (holding that the defendant was not entitled to a hearing, but noting every review was a hearing in which the defendant had an opportunity to participate.)

http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=7007886361718095145&q=748+N.Y.S.2d+222&hl=en&as_sdt=2,6

Hagar v. State, 990 P.2d 894, 899 (Okla. Crim. App. 1999) (defendant was statutorily entitled to notice of the grounds for termination)

http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=5311017983618242880&q=990+P.2d+894&hl=en&as_sdt=2,6

Disciplinary Counsel v. Repp, 2021 Ohio 3923 - Ohio: Supreme Court 2021: Judge was suspended from practicing law for one year for ordering a participant’s girlfriend who was observing court to provide a drug test. When she refused the judge held her in contempt of court and sentenced her to ten day in jail. https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=12274094881507444905&hl=en&lr=lang_en&as_sdt=6,26&as_vis=1

In the Matter of the Honorable Patrick R. Miller, former Judge of the Adams Superior Court, Supreme Court Case No. 21S-JD-513, Supreme Court of Indiana, January 21, 2022. https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=13256750223625584099&hl=en&lr=lang_en&as_sdt=6,26&as_vis=1

Judge disciplined and barred from holding judicial office for life for violating the Judicial Code of Conduct Rule 1.1 and 1.2, by failing to maintain an appearance of impartiality and by failing to comply with the law. Judge while running for reelection, had a drug court employee engage in campaign activities during business hours. Additionally the judge provided a drug court participant with a campaign yard sign, which was placed in the participant’s yard.

Conner v. State, 248 A. 3d 318 (Md. 2021) (Excellent analysis of the judicial recusal issue, ultimately holding recusal not required. The court noted: “Although these concerns are not implicated actually by the record in this case, we shall refer to the Rules Committee the 336*336 issue of whether specific additional or different guidance for recusal of judges who have participated in Drug Court proceedings, whether by presiding or by receiving communications as a member of the therapeutic team, should be incorporated into Rule 18-102.11 and/or Rule 16-207.” The Maryland Supreme Court cited the NDCI Judicial Benchbook.) https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=4254584226004187928&q=248+a.+3d+318&hl=en&as_sdt=4006

IN RE DISQUALIFICATION OF HARRIS, 162 NE 3d 835 - Ohio: Supreme Court 2020 ("[t]he Code of Judicial Conduct contemplates that a judge who administers a specialized docket assumes a more interactive role with parties, treatment providers, probation officers, social workers, and others." In re Disqualification of Yost, 155 Ohio St.3d 1266, 2018-Ohio-5257, 121 N.E.3d 382, ¶ 4, citing Jud.Cond.R. 2.9, Comment 4A (recognizing that a judge may initiate, receive, permit, or consider ex parte communications 836*836 when administering a specialized docket). Therefore, the fact that a judge may have been exposed to certain information about a participant in or applicant to a specialized-docket program—information that the judge may not have learned in the more traditional judicial forum —does not automatically require the judge's disqualification from matters involving the participant or applicant. "In these situations, the ability of a judge to preside fairly and impartially in a particular matter `must be analyzed on a case-by-case basis.'" Id., quoting In re Disqualification of Blanchard, 150 Ohio St.3d 1260, 2017-Ohio-5543, 80 N.E.3d 504, ¶ 5.) https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=1819012228997479821&q=%22drug+court%22&hl=en&scisbd=2&as_sdt=6,44&as_ylo=2020

State v. Marcotte, 943 NW 2d 911 - Wis: Court of Appeals 2020 (“Notably, we do not hold that a judge who has presided over drug court proceedings involving a particular defendant can never sentence that defendant after the revocation of his or her probation. Whether a judge is objectively biased under those circumstances must be determined on a case-by-case basis. Here, the record 922*922 contains other evidence of objective bias, beyond the mere fact that Judge Morrison presided over both the drug court proceedings and Marcotte's sentencing after revocation. Specifically, the record shows that Judge Morrison: (1) made multiple comments indicating he had prejudged Marcotte's sentence; (2) repeatedly referred to his personal frustration with Marcotte's failure in drug court during the sentencing after revocation hearing; and (3) expressly stated when imposing Marcotte's sentence after revocation that he was relying on information he had learned during the drug court proceedings.

Taken together, these factors give rise to an appearance of bias that is sufficient to reveal a great risk of actual bias. Moreover, that great risk of actual bias was borne out by the fact that Judge Morrison ultimately imposed a sentence after revocation that was longer than those recommended by both the State and the DOC. Accordingly, Marcotte has met his burden to overcome the presumption that Judge Morrison was unbiased, and we therefore reverse and remand for Marcotte to be resentenced by a different judge.”) https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=9216568648485838667&q=%22drug+court%22&hl=en&scisbd=2&as_sdt=4006&as_ylo=2020&as_yhi=2020

STATE OF WASHINGTON, Respondent, v. CHERRINGTON, ALECIA MARIE, DOB: 07/12/1981, Appellant. (September 28, 2020) (same judge as in Lemke below-court again used demeaning approach) https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=411932280406232973&q=%22drug+court%22&hl=en&scisbd=2&as_sdt=6,44&as_ylo=2020

State v. Lemke, 434 P. 3d 551 (Wash.  Court of Appeals, 1st Div. 2018) (No judge wielding the power of the State in any courtroom has any good reason to call a litigant a "fucking addict" and "just a criminal." The judge's manifestation of personal animosity toward Lemke is not something we can write off as a byproduct of the informal and confrontational culture of drug court. A "fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process." In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136, 75 S.Ct. 623, 99 L.Ed. 942 (1955). The sentence must be reversed.) https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=7773289299381191707&q=%22drug+court%22&hl=en&scisbd=2&as_sdt=2006&as_ylo=2018

State v. Walker, Not Selected (Wash: Court of Appeals, 1st Div. 2019) (same trial court judge as in Lemke, above, has extended colloquy with drug court participant and that frank and pointed discussion not sufficient basis to disqualify judge) https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=10391399105146740807&q=%22drug+court%22&hl=en&scisbd=2&as_sdt=4006

State v. Baker, 2019 Ohio 1807 (Ohio: Court of Appeals, 7th Appellate Dist. 2019) (appellate court did not have jurisdiction on late raised prejudiced judge motion but even if it did court was not required to recuse where there was no evidence in the record that prior representation evinced bias by judge) https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=10148200649782669100&hl=en&lr=lang_en&as_sdt=40006&as_vis=1&oi=scholaralrt&hist=f_OieYgAAAAJ:5630771474538523222:AAGBfm0ySInok

US v. Merrill, Dist. Court, D. Idaho (6/10/19)  (Federal District Court judge was not required to recuse from defendant’s case, where he had previously recused as a state judge in a drug court termination hearing because of an informal policy) https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=14681137156356742614&hl=en&lr=lang_en&as_sdt=40006&as_vis=1&oi=scholaralrt&hist=f_OieYgAAAAJ:5630771474538523222:AAGBfm0y

In re Day, 362 Or 547, 636, 413 P.3d 907 (2018) (judge suspended from office for fraternizing with Veteran’s Treatment Court participant, among numerous other ethical and candor issues) https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=14026683254312852800&q=vance+d+day&hl=en&as_sdt=4,38&as_ylo=2018

State v. Horne, (Tenn. Court of Criminal Appeals 2017) (Telling defendant that this is his last chance is not prohibited as pre-judging the consequences of the next infraction) https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=18125597248666085561&hl=en&lr=lang_en&as_sdt=40006&as_vis=1&oi=scholaralrt

IN RE DISQUALIFICATION OF BLANCHARD, 2017 Ohio 5543 (Ohio Supreme Court 2017) ( “The fact that the same judge presides over a parent's dependency case and her drug-court hearings does not, without more, mandate the judge's disqualification from one of those matters.  Nor does the fact that Judge Blanchard may have heard prejudicial information about the parents in drug-court hearings necessarily require his removal from the dependency cases. In general, what a judge learns in his official judicial capacity in another proceeding is not the kind of information that leads to disqualification

Judge Blanchard is also correct, however, that the ability of a judge to preside fairly and impartially in a particular matter must be analyzed on a case-by-case basis. Hypothetically, a judge could be exposed to such highly prejudicial information in a parent's drug-court hearings that the likelihood of bias or an appearance of bias in a parent's dependency case would be unacceptably high. But here, the parents' general and nonspecific claim that Judge Blanchard "heard numerous prejudicial facts" about them in drug-court hearings is insufficient to overcome the presumption of the judge's impartiality.)

https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=12656212445592232439&hl=en&lr=lang_en&as_sdt=40006&as_vis=1&oi=scholaralrt

State v. Barraza, ____ P.3d ___ (NM Court of Appeals 2017) (defendant received sufficient due process protections in her termination from drug court and the judge was not required to recuse) https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?about=6563772992073809641&hl=en&lr=lang_en&as_sdt=4006&as_vis=1

Minnesota v. Cleary, 882 N.W.2d 899 (Court of Appeals of Minnesota July 5, 2016.) (When the sole basis for revoking probation is a probationer's termination from drug court and the drug court judge participated in the drug court team's decision to terminate the probationer from drug court, a probationer is entitled to have a judge other than the drug court judge preside over the probation revocation hearing, because of the appearance of lack of impartiality)

https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=4891538259008484620&q=mylo+cleary&hl=en&as_sdt=4,24&as_ylo=2016

State v. McGill, No. M2015-01929-CCA-R3-CD. (Tenn: Court of Criminal Appeals 7/18/2016) (Based on this Court's ruling in Donte Dewayne Watson,  No. M2015-00108-CCA-R3-CD, 2016 WL 791563 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 1, 2016), we conclude that there is no clear and unequivocal rule of law that a trial judge must recuse himself simply because he was also a member of a defendant's drug court team. There must be some proof in the record that the trial judge either received ex parte communications or was actively involved in the defendant's treatment in order to show that the trial judge was neither neutral nor detached. In this case, there is no proof in the record that the trial court judge was privy to any ex parte communications regarding the subject matter of Defendant's community corrections violation or that he relied upon information learned during the course of the drug court program without giving Defendant a fair chance for rebuttal.)

https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=13142646625815210874&q=roy+mcgill&hl=en&as_sdt=4,43&as_ylo=2016

State v. Watson, No. 507 S.W.3d 191 (2016)., (Tenn: Court of Criminal Appeals 2016)  Drug court judge’s  not required to recuse or a violation of due process distinguishing Tennessee v. Stewart,   No. M2008-00474-CCA-R3-CD Filed  October 6, 2008 Unpublished Opinion and State v. Brent R. Stewart, No. W2009-00980-CCA-R3-CD, 2010 WL 3293920 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 18, 2010). https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=33420376567717355&q=Tennessee+v.+Stewart,+++No.+M2008-00474-CCA-R3-&hl=en&as_sdt=4006

Dominey v. State, Not Selected for Publication,  (Tex. App., 2015) (defendant’s allegations that the judge obtained information from an extrajudicial source was rebutted by defendant’s own statements and no showing was made that the judge was anything but impartial in this deferred adjudication sentence)

https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=3699325448087166049&hl=en&lr=lang_en&as_sdt=4006&as_vis=1&oi=scholaralrt

Gross v. State of Maine, Superior Court case # CR-11-4805 (2/26/13)(drug court procedures relating to termination violative of due process and, therefore, unconstitutional.  Drug Court participant entitled to: notice of the termination allegations and the evidence against him, right to call and x-examine witnesses, a hearing at which he is present, a neutral magistrate, written factual findings and the right to counsel.  Here, the drug court team discussed the termination decision during the termination hearing, without defendant’s presence or that of his counsel.  That procedure coupled by the fact the Superior Court felt that the drug court judge should have recused, resulted in a finding of constitutional infirmity.  Moreover, the appellate court ruled the defendant did not, arguably could not prospectively waive his rights, citing LaPlaca and Staley.

https://docs.google.com/a/jaginc.com/file/d/0B3rjtxVPOqL7a01CeEZPT1RkSFU/edit?pli=1

State v. Tatlow, 231 Ariz. 34, 290 P.3d 228 ( 2012) (no due process violation for judge to hear drug court termination and probation revocation)

http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=18145047738948527281&hl=en&lr=lang_en&as_sdt=2,10&as_vis=1&oi=scholaralrt

IN RE: M.W. and Mi. W. Minor Children, 2012 Ohio 5075 (2012) (no due process violation to have dependency/neglect trial court judge also preside over drug court, where respondent is in both courts)

http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=11004603746354874130&hl=en&lr=lang_en&as_sdt=2,10&as_vis=1&oi=scholaralrt

Arizona v. Perez Cano, No. 1 CA-CR 11-0473 Court of Appeals of Arizona (September 20, 2012) UNPUBLISHED (Judge was not required to recuse for drug court termination hearing.)

http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=4169971555218744981&q=perez+cano&hl=en&as_sdt=4,67,185&as_ylo=2008

Grayson v. Kentucky, No. 2011-CA-000399-MR. Court of Appeals  of Kentucky UNPUBLISHED ( June 29, 2012) (Judge was not required to recuse for drug court termination hearing.) http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=16272897103924913248&q=Grayson+v.+Kentucky&hl=en&as_sdt=4,185&as_ylo=2008

Turner v. Arkansas, 2012 Ark. 357 (2012) (The fact that prosecutor and judge both received grant funding for drug court did not facially give rise to sufficient facts for recusal)

http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=12983043408876007892&hl=en&lr=lang_en&as_sdt=2,10&as_vis=1&oi=scholaralrt

Tennessee v. Stewart, No. W2009-00980-CCA-R3-CD, Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee, (August 18, 2010) (It was a due process violation for drug court judge to hear probation revocation hearing.)

http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=863473147460870417&q=W2009-00980-CCA-R3-CD&hl=en&as_sdt=4,185,235,236&as_ylo=2008

Ford v. Kentucky, and William E. Flener v. Kentucky, No. 2008-CA-001990-MR, No. 2009-CA-000889-MR, No. 2009-CA-000461-MR, 2010 Ky. App. Unpub. LEXIS 380 (Ky. Appellate Apr. 30, 2010) (holding that having same judge preside over drug court and revocation hearing is not a denial of right to impartial hearing/due process)

http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=12724236459603888154&q=2009-CA-000889-MR&hl=en&as_sdt=2,6

Model Code of Judicial Conduct R. 2.11 (2007). (If continuing on the case would create an appearance of impropriety, such non-recusal would implicate Canon 2 of the Canons of Judicial Conduct.)

http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/publications/model_code_of_judicial_conduct/model_code_of_judicial_conduct_table_of_contents.html

Wilkinson v. State, 641 S.E.2d 189, 191 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006). (As part of her drug court contract the defendant waived her ability to move for recusal of the drug court judge.)

http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=8885167188246864611&q=641+S.E.2d+189&hl=en&as_sdt=2,6

State v. Belyea, 160 N.H. 298, 999 A.2d 1080 (N.H. 2010) (holding that the defendant failed to show that a reasonable person would entertain significant concern about whether Judge Vaughan prejudged the facts or abandoned or compromised his impartiality in his judicial role on the drug court team)

https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=9714928951977948426&q=999+A.2d+1080+&hl=en&as_sdt=4006

Inquiry of Baker, 74 P.3d 1077, 1077 (Or. 2003) (censuring judge for failing to disqualify herself from probation revocation hearing in which the events giving rise to the proceeding occurred at a restaurant in front of judge)

http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=12636016921646631225&q=74+P.3d+1077&hl=en&as_sdt=2,6

Youn v. Track, 324 F.3d 409, 423 (6th Cir. 2003) (holding that the court’s comments and rulings do not show bias when they were based upon evidence acquired during proceedings)

http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=1492366718762277970&q=324+F.3d+409&hl=en&as_sdt=2,6

Alexander v. State, 48 P.3d 110, 115 (Okla. Crim. App. 2002) (“Requiring the District Court to act as Drug Court team member, evaluator, monitor, and final adjudicator in a termination proceeding could compromise the impartiality of a district court judge assigned the responsibility of administering a Drug Court participant’s program Therefore, in the future, if an application to terminate a Drug Court participant is filed, and the defendant objects to the Drug Court team judge hearing the matter by filing a Motion to Recuse, the defendant’s application for recusal should be granted and the motion to remove the defendant from the Drug Court program should be assigned to another judge for resolution”)

http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=1335043177512760261&q=48+P.3d+110&hl=en&as_sdt=2,6

United States v. Ayala, 289 F.3d 16, 27 (1st Cir. 2002) (stating that the standard is whether the facts, as asserted, lead an objective reasonable observer to question the judge’s impartiality)

http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=18134676221423814555&q=289+F.3d+16&hl=en&as_sdt=2,6

United States v. Microsoft, 253 F.3d 34, 117 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (holding that the judge’s comments to the press while the case was pending demonstrated bias)

http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=17987618389090921096&q=253+F.3d+34&hl=en&as_sdt=2,6

United States v. Bailey, 175 F.3d 966, 969 (11th Cir. 1999) (holding that recusal was not required where judge received facts from judicial source)

http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=4134427899964583633&q=175+F.3d+966&hl=en&as_sdt=2,6

Edgar v. K.L., 93 F.3d 256, 259 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that judge who received off the record briefings had extra judicial personal knowledge of facts)

http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=12528096164268582940&q=93+F.3d+256,+&hl=en&as_sdt=2,6

Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994) (Usually the basis of recusal is due to partiality or bias acquired outside the context of the proceedings – or from an “extrajudicial source)

http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=5020361090884494681&q=510+U.S.+540&hl=en&as_sdt=2,6

Lozano v. State, 751 P.2d 1326, 1326 (Wyo. 1988) (holding that the mere fact that probation revocation judge witnessed defendant in bar drinking in violation of her probation was not error, where the defendant freely admitted she was drinking in violation of probation)

http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=9240559677541632490&q=751+P.2d+1326&hl=en&as_sdt=2,6

In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136-139 (1955) (recusing a judge because he could not detach himself from personal knowledge of secret grand jury proceedings)

http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=5168959113714556385&q=349+U.S.+133&hl=en&as_sdt=2,6

1. State v. Hunt, 476 P. 3d 530 - Or: Court of Appeals 2020 (differentiating between sanctions in drug and modification of the terms of probation—finding statutorily that probation violation fee is a sanction, modifying community service is a sanction and a weekend in jail was a sanction) https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=10258167865130121991&q=%22drug+court%22&hl=en&scisbd=2&as_sdt=6,44&as_ylo=2020
2. Brookman v. State, Md: Court of Special Appeals 2017 (Sanctions imposed reversed and remanded for a hearing. Defendants wanted to contest sanctions imposed without a hearing for low creatinine results and failure to appear for a drug test. Court held it was a due process violation to not accord an adversarial hearing, including the right to counsel, the ability to call witnesses and a continuance, if necessary for preparation.)
3. Taylor v. State, CR-15-0354 (Ala. Crim. App. 9/9/16) (Sanctioning hearing using hearsay not due process violation. Concurrence: I realize that developing specific procedures for handling drug-court sanctions can be an arduous task — especially given the dearth of case law in this State addressing drug-court programs. I would encourage other drug-court judges in this State either to use or to develop a drug-court-sanction procedure similar to the one outlined in this Court's opinion (ie: provision of a hearing). I would also recommend to other drug-court professionals that they take advantage of the vast training resources and educational opportunities available through the National Association of Drug Court Professionals.)
4. Taylor v. State, CR-15-0354 (Ala. Crim. App. 9/9/16) (Sanctioning hearing using hearsay not due process violation.  Concurrence: I realize that developing specific procedures for handling drug-court sanctions can be an arduous task — especially given the dearth of case law in this State addressing drug-court programs. I would encourage other drug-court judges in this State either to use or to develop a drug-court-sanction procedure similar to the one outlined in this Court's opinion (ie: provision of a hearing). I would also recommend to other drug-court professionals that they take advantage of the vast training resources and educational opportunities available through the National Association of Drug Court Professionals.)
5. Kemper v. State, Ind: No. 82A01-1508-CR-1104.(Court of Appeals 2016) Not Selected for Publication (In an appeal of a drug court’s imposition of a sanctions that the defendant thought were too harsh, the appellate court stated: Drug Court is a forensic diversion program akin to community corrections and probation. Withers v. State, 15 N.E.3d 660, 665 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). Accordingly, we review a trial court's sentencing decisions for Drug Court violations for an abuse of discretion. Id. We will find an abuse of discretion only where the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances)
6. Hoffman v. Jacobi (S.D. Ind., 9/29/2015)(Magistrate Judge recommends class certification on 42 USC §1983 damages and injunctive relief suit against Drug Court Judge and team for incarcerating participants for lengthy periods of time, while awaiting placement in drug treatment facilities. Plaintiffs allege that the decision to hold them in jail pending placement was made without counsel, hearing, consideration of bond, or other rights of due process)
7. Mississippi Commission on Judicial Performance v. Thompson, ____Miss. ___, (Miss Supreme Court 5/21/2015) (Drug Court Judge removed from office for, inter alia, sanctioning individuals to jail without according due process of hearing. Judge Thompson's conduct of depriving participants in drug court of their due-process rights when he signed orders of contempt without the persons being properly notified of the charge of contempt or a right to a hearing, and by conducting "hearings" immediately after "staffing meetings" without adequate time for the persons to have proper counsel or evidence presented, violated Canons 1, 2A, 3B(1), 3B(2), 3B(4), 3B(8), and constitutes willful misconduct in office and conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice.)
8. Hoffman v. Jacobi, 4:14-cv-00012-SEB-TAB. (S.D. Ind. 10-17-2014) (denying a motion to dismiss lawsuit against a former Drug Court Judge, who was alleged to have incarcerated drug court participants for lengthy periods without due process of law.  Even though the drug court has been discontinued, the federal district court did not find the matter moot nor subject to the Younger (Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37(1971)) abstention doctrine, even though it involved the administration of another court.)
9. Paley v. The Second Judicial District Court, 129 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 74 (2013) (Absent evidence of conduct that actually disrupts the court proceeding, a positive out-of-court drug test is not a sufficient basis for holding a party in contempt of court because no contemptuous conduct occurs in the "immediate view and presence" of the judge.)
10. In the Interest of C.K., Case No. 2D12-633,District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District (Opinion filed May 4, 2012)(failure to give notice of FDTC hearing which limited parental contact was a due process violation)
11. Commonwealth v. Nicely, 2009-SC-000313-DG (Ky. 11-18-2010)  (“The dissent also expresses concern that a drug court sanction cannot be a modification of probation because the elements of due process normally accorded a defendant at a probation revocation hearing are not followed. For example, the defendant appearing before the drug court judge usually does not have counsel. However, defendants who enter drug court waive those rights while in the program, and upon discharge from the program, the defendant retains all those rights at any revocation hearing that follows.”)
12. State v. Stewart, (Tenn. Crim. App. 8-18-2010) (Not Selected for Official Publication) (Having reviewed the record, we are additionally troubled by the four or five occasions where the defendant in this case was "sanctioned" to significant jail time by the drug court team during the two years he participated in the program. Leaving aside (as we must) the obvious due process concerns attendant to any additional deprivation of the defendant's liberty that has been imposed through a collaborative, non-adversarial, and at times ex parte process rather than through a traditional adversarial evidentiary hearing, there is considerable tension between this outcome and the general guidelines under which drug courts should operate. The drug court program explicitly recognizes that alcohol and drug addition "is a chronic, relapsing condition," that "many participants [will] exhibit a pattern of positive urine tests," and expressly contemplates that many participants will experience periods of relapse "[e]ven after a period of sustained abstinence.")
13. Tyler T., 279 Neb. 806, 806 (2010) (“Given the therapeutic component of problem-solving-court programs, we are not prepared to say that each and every action taken in such a proceeding must be a matter of record. But we have no difficulty in concluding that when a judge of a problem-solving court conducts a hearing and enters an order affecting the terms of the juvenile's probation, the proceeding must be on the record. We agree with other courts which have held that where a liberty interest is implicated in problem-solving-court proceedings, an individual's due process rights must be respected.”).
14. Walker v. Lamberti, 29 So. 3d 1172, 1172 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (holding that a defendant who voluntarily agreed to participate in drug court cannot subsequently opt out to avoid jail–based drug treatment program)
15. Thorne v. Hale, No. 1:08cv601 (JCC), 2009 WL 980136 (E.D. Va. Mar. 26, 2009) aff’d, Thorne v. Hale, No. 09-2305, WL1018048 (4th Cir. Mar. 19, 2010)(§1983 claimant was unsuccessful because of procedural requirements and absolute judicial immunity. However, the federal court makes staffings and the sanctioning process sound like a Star Chamber: “Thorne claims that, during the ‘sanctions’ hearings that followed his failure to adhere to the drug court's rules, the allegations against him, the testimony of witnesses, and the presentation of evidence violated his Sixth Amendment rights. Testimony, he asserts, was "made in secrete [sic] between the Drug Court and RACSB administrators, {Defendants Kelly Hale, Judith Alston and Sharon Gillian}," the RACSB, the Commonwealth's Attorney, and the state court judge, "to include whispered testimony to the presiding Judge at the bench, so as to exclude Plaintiff . . . from all measures of defense and redress commensurate with Due and Compulsory Process of Law.")
16. State v. Rogers, 170 P.3d 881, 881 (Idaho 2007) (holding that termination hearings are required in drug courts, at least where defendant pled guilty and his was sentence deferred, but also noting in dicta that such requirements are not required when sanctions are imposed)
17. Mullin v. Jenne, 890 So. 2d 543, 543 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005) (holding that jail can be used as a sanction for defendants who choose to remain in voluntary program)
18. T.N. v. Portesy, 932 So. 2d 267, 267 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App 2005) (holding that a court cannot impose sanctions beyond those authorized by statute, even if agreed to by the juvenile drug court participant upon entry into program)
19. Diaz v. State, 884 So. 2d 299, 299 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (holding that jail cannot be used as a sanction in a pre-plea contractual drug court program because not authorized by statute)
20. In re Miguel, 63 P.3d 1065, 1065 (Ariz. App. 2003). (Appellate Court appeared require a hearing when the juvenile defendants raised the due process issue and the possibility of jail or detention sanctions at a review hearing)
21. See Staley v. State, 851 So. 2d 805, 805 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (concluding that waiver of hearing rights in a drug court contract impugns the integrity of the justice system and undermines public confidence in the judiciary)
22. Sandlin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 472 (1995)(prisoner entitled to hearing on disciplinary proceedings could impact good or earned time)
23. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 790 (1973) (probationer entitled to preliminary and revocation hearing)

1. Javier E. Andrade v. State of Florida, No. 4D21-1472, (4th District Court of Appeals, 2021). The Court of Appeals remanded the case for de novo consideration where the petitioner was denied entry into drug court despite meeting statutorily mandated eligibility criteria. The sentencing court had denied access to drug court based on the victim’s objection. The Court stated: “If the trial court determines that Petitioner meets all of section 948.08(6)(b)'s eligibility requirements, including section 948.08(6)(b)1., "[u]pon motion of either party or the court's own motion, and with the agreement of the defendant, the court shall admit an eligible person into a pretrial substance abuse education and treatment intervention program. . . ." § 948.08(6)(c), Fla. Stat. (2020) (emphasis added). This is subject to three exceptions that neither party contends are applicable here. Thus, if Petitioner met the eligibility requirements of section 948.08(6)(b), the trial court shall admit him into the program, regardless of the inclinations of either the purported victim or the trial court
   https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=17372301945292680136&hl=en&lr=lang_en&as_sdt=6,26&as_vis=1
2. State v. 2^nd Judicial Dist. Of Nevada, 134 Nev. Adv. Opinion 96 (12/6/2018) (In a separation of powers case, Nevada statutes authorizes district courts to assign certain eligible defendants to a veteran’s court program.  However, if the offense charged or the defendant's prior convictions involved the use or threatened use of force or violence, the district court is not allowed to assignthe defendant to the veterans court program, "unless the prosecuting attorney stipulates to the assignment." NRS 176A.290(2).The Nevada Supreme Court found the statute was in effect a prosecutorial veto over a judge's sentencing decision, in violation of the Nevada Constitution's separation of powers doctrine. Nev. Const. art. 3, § (1)(1). The court further held that the veto provision wasseverable.)https://www.leg.state.nv.us/Session/80th2019/Exhibits/Assembly/JUD/AJUD320H.pdf
3. People v. Rydzewski, (Mich: Court of Appeals 1/23/2020) (State does not have statutory right to veto admission into mental health court as is provided in drug court statute)
4. Simeone v. State, 276 So. 3d 797 (Fla: Dist. Court of Appeals, 4th Dist. 2019) (although Defendant may be eligible for Veterans’ Treatment Court, that does not mean he is entitled to admission to such court)
5. People v. MacDowell, Cal: Court of Appeal, 3rd Appellate Dist. 2018 (not selected) (disqualifier from problem-solving court because not live in the county, not a constitutional   violation)
6. State v. Vargas, (N.J. Appellate Div. 2017) (Denial of drug court application merely because defendant went to trial and was convicted was error because “a court cannot impose a "trial penalty" on a defendant who chooses to invoke that constitutional right.”)
7. Wisc. V. Keister, Wisconsin Circuit Court, Iowa County, 7/16/17 (holding unconstitutional statutes that prohibited defendant from being admitted to drug court or being required to be expelled from drug court because he was charged with a violent offense)
8. State v. Barclay, ___ N.W. 2d ___ (Iowa Court of Appeals 1/11/2017) (Defendant asserts he was denied access to drug court because of his mental health disability—a violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act-ADA.  The court doubted whether the ADA provides rights at sentencing and held that Barclay had not proven his mental illness hampered a major life activity.  The court also noted Barclay had not properly preserved his equal protection argument.)
9. People v. Baldes ,___ Mich. ___  (Mich. Court of Appeals  2015) (prosecutor approval to admission to drug court not obtained and thus court placement vacated)
10. State v. Mauer, ___N. J. Superior ___ (12/17/14) (The disparity in this case is highlighted by the fact that now offenders convicted of second-degree robbery armed with a non-deadly weapon are permitted to enter Drug Court while Track Two offenders like defendant, who
    recently committed a third-degree drug offense and years earlier had been convicted of a weapons charge are barred entry. It is simply not fair that defendant's record would disqualify him under one track but not the other. There is no valid policy consideration to support that result and the distinction subverts, rather than supports, the policy to admit
    drug-addicted offenders into the program.
      Our opinion is supported by the Legislature's decision to remove the prosecutor's ability to object to a defendant's admission to Drug Court subject only to proof that his or her decision was a patent or gross abuse of discretion. By its action, the Legislature clearly evinced an intention to rely on a judge's discretion and ability to better determine admission
    without continuing the prosecutor's right to veto.
      Our decision does not, however, result in defendant's automatic admission to Drug Court; it only allows his application to be considered despite his earlier weapons offense. On remand, the court must now consider relevant factors specific to defendant, guiding Drug Court admission, including his dangerousness to the community while on probation, whether he is
    in fact drug dependent; and defendant's entire criminal history, including his weapons conviction, along with any other factor impacting this determination.)
11. State v. Easley, 322 P.3d 296 (Idaho 3-28-2014) (Prosecutor’s veto of court’s ability to re-sentence convicted offender to mental health court violated Separation of Powers doctrine, because the prosecutor was making eligibility determinations for the mental health court post-judgment rather than pre-judgment, it was exercising judicial functions.)
12. Amick v. Director of  Revenue, SC93742 (Mo. banc 4-15-2014) (There is no equal protection violation in allowing DWI court graduates and participants the opportunity to obtain limited driving privileges while denying the same opportunity to non-participants because it is rationally related to the legitimate state interest in protecting the public from drunken drivers.)
13. State v. Waldenberg, 174 Wn. App. 163 (2013) (Spokane County's practice of allowing the prosecutor to make initial determinations of drug court eligibility does not constitute an unconstitutional delegation of judicial power to the prosecutor. The separation of powers doctrine is not violated.)
14. People v. Watford, 2012 NY Slip Op 22121, County Court of the City of New York, Monroe County (Decided April 25, 2012) (defendant entitled to diversionary drug court, citing detailed analysis of beneficial attributes of attending and finishing drug treatment)
15. PEOPLE v. WILLIAM ANDREW HENRY, C067258, Court of Appeals of California (July 17, 2012) UNPUBLISHED, (Although statute requires assessment of fees, termination of drug court cannot be sustained for non-payment without finding that defendant had ability to pay)
16. State v. Woodard, No. A-5980-09T1., Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division, Not selected for Publication, (September 23, 2011) (the standard is high to overturn a prosecutor's rejection of an applicant for the Drug Court program, in this case, the Drug Court judge had an ample basis to conclude that the standard had been met and that there was no reliable evidence that defendant was a gang member who posed a substantial threat to the community, thus entry into drug Court approved)
17. People v. Ray Earl Webb, No. D056735 (Court of Appeals of California, Fourth District, Division One, March 15, 2011) UNPUBLISHED (defendant not denied due process or other constitutional rights when he was rejected for drug court because he was taking strong narcotic medicines which would interfere with his ability to participate in the drug court program)
18. People v. Tyler White, 2011 NY Slip Op 50731(U) (April 26, 2011) (Where defendant met all the criteria for entry into drug court, prosecution’s opposition could not bar entry)
19. State v. Clarke/Dolan, 1 A. 3d 607 (N.J. 2010) (A plenary hearing in which one or more team members would testify is not required at the hearing on an appeal from the denial of entry into drug court. Although Drug Court judges have the discretion to permit witnesses to testify when a genuine issue of material fact needs to be resolved, an informal hearing is sufficient for the court to give full and fair consideration to the applicant's appeal.)
20. People v. Forkey, 72 A.D.3d 1209, 1209 (N.Y. App. Div. 2010) (holding that the defendant is not entitled to hearing before being rejected for drug court)
21. People v. Trask, 191 Cal.App.4th 387, 119 Cal.Rptr.3d 91 (2010) (a criminal defendant granted deferred entry of judgment may not be terminated from such diversion based solely on her inability to pay the fees of the program to which she has been referred.)
22. Phillips v. State, 25 So. 3d 404, 404 (Miss. Ct. App. 2010) (defendant has no right to enter drug court)
23. State v. Saxon, No. A-1964-08T4, 2010 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 613, (N.J. Mar. 23, 2010) (holding that the defendant is not entitled to enter the drug court program)
24. Evans v. State, 667 S.E.2d 183, 183 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008) (because defendant was a medical management problem because of his AIDS, it was not a denial of equal protection or a violation of ADA to refuse him admittance to drug court)
25. Krauel v. Florida, Case No. 08-14093-CIV-MARTINEZ-BANDSTRA.(United States District Court, S.D. Florida July 15, 2008) (Participation in the drug court program is discretionary and denial of entry is not a due process or equal protection violation because drug court does not create a right that involves a liberty interest)
26. Lomont v. State, 852 N.E.2d 1002, 1002 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (holding that the lack of a drug diversion program in the relevant county does not treat the defendant unfairly or unequally, as compared to other defendants, because all defendants in that county do not have access to a drug diversion program)
27. Jim v. State, 911 So. 2d 658, 658 (Miss. Ct. App. 2005) (no denial of equal protection to not offer drug court to all defendants when it is generally available in county)
28. State v. Jason G. Meyer, 192 N.J. 421, 930 A.2d 428 (N.J. 2007) (consistent with the Drug Court Manual and N.J.S.A. 2C:45-1, the trial court was vested with the discretion to admit defendant into Drug Court and to impose a probationary term with conditions that included defendant abiding by the “specific [drug] treatment plan determined by the [in-patient] facility and Drug Court Team)
29. State v. Harner, 103 P.3d 738, 738 (Wash. 2004) (Court held that because each county needed to tailor its programs to meet fiscal resources and community obligations, the decision not to fund a drug court was rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose)
30. In re Miguel, 63 P.3d 1065, 1074 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003) (no equal protection violation to place defendant in drug court)
31. People v. Espinoza, 132 Cal. Rptr. 2d 670 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003) (holding that an illegal alien status is proper consideration for denial of Prop. 36 referral to treatment)
32. State v. Little, 66 P.3d 1099, 1099 (Wash. Ct. App. 2003) (not entitled to hearing before denial of admission to drug court)
33. C.D.C. v. State, 821 So. 2d 1021, 1025 (Ala. Crim. App. 2001) (no due process violation to not offer defendant drug court)
34. Yemson v. United States, 764 A.2d 816, 819 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (appellant failed to show that his nationality and his immigration status served as the basis for the sentence he received, rather than his unlawful conduct)
35. People v. Cisneros, 100 Cal. Rptr. 2d 784, 784 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000) (holding that an illegal alien status is not automatic disqualification for drug court)
36. Woodward v. Morrissey, 1999 OK CR 43, 991 P.2d 1042, 1045 (Okla. 1999) (prosecutor's power to veto diversion of case to Drug Court program)
37. State v. Shelton, 204 W. Va. 311, 512 S.E.2d 568 (1998) (Where defendant denied in home detention because he could not afford the monitor, and, thus, was remanded to jail to do his sentence, was a violation of equal protection to deny home detention based on indigency)

1. STATE v. CRAMER, No. SCWC-11-0000085.(Hawaii 2013) (Trial court abused its discretion in not allowing substitution of counsel at sentencing hearing after termination from drug court)
2. Gross v. State of Maine, Superior Court case # CR-11-4805 (2/26/13)(drug court procedures relating to termination violative of due process and, therefore, unconstitutional.  Drug Court participant entitled to: notice of the termination allegations and the evidence against him, right to call and x-examine witnesses, a hearing at which he is present, a neutral magistrate, written factual findings and the right to counsel.  Here, the drug court team discussed the termination decision during the termination hearing, without defendant’s presence or that of his counsel.  That procedure coupled by the fact the Superior Court felt that the drug court judge should have recused, resulted in a finding of constitutional infirmity.  Moreover, the appellate court ruled the defendant did not, arguably could not prospectively waive his rights, citing LaPlaca and Staley.
3. Rothegery v. Gillespie County, 554 U.S. 191 (2008) (A criminal defendant's initial appearance before a magistrate judge, where he learns the charge against him and his liberty is subject to restriction, marks the initiation of adversary judicial proceedings that trigger attachment of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Attachment does not also require that a prosecutor (as distinct from a police officer) be aware of that initial proceeding or involved in its conduct.)
4. DeMillard v. State, 190 P.3d 128, 128 (Wyo. 2008) (probation modification proceedings not critical stage of proceedings and therefore no right to counsel)
5. Indiana v. Edwards, 128 S. Ct. 2379, 2379 (2008) (holding that a court may deny a person the right to self representation due to mental illness, even when the court finds that the person is competent to stand trial)
6. State v. Kouba, 709 N.W.2d 299, 299 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006) (a modification of the terms of probation is a critical stage of the proceedings, where the right to counsel attaches, at least where the modification adds significant terms to probation)
7. Iowa v. Tovar, 541 U.S. 77, 92 (2004) (searching inquiry before allowing waiver of counsel)
8. Robinson v. Ignacio, 360 F.3d 1044 (9th Cir. 2004) (defendant who has waived his right to counsel may nonetheless re-assert that right)
9. State v. Thomas, 659 N.W.2d 217, 217 (Iowa 2003) (sentencing hearing is a critical stage of the proceeding and counsel should be present, absent a waiver)
10. Dunson v. Kentucky, 57 S.W.3d 847, 847 (Ky. Ct. App. 2001) (concluding that defendant’s assertions that he was denied counsel were unfounded because he was never without counsel at any critical stage of the proceedings)
11. State v. Sommer, 878 P.2d 1007, 1008 (N.M. Ct. App. 1994) (a modification of the terms of probation is a critical stage of the proceedings, where the right to counsel attaches, at least where the modification adds significant terms to probation)
12. Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 401 (1977) (right to counsel attaches at every critical stage of the proceedings, after initiation of adversarial judicial proceedings)
13. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 822 (1975). (Individual generally has the right to represent him/her self)
14. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 787 (1973) (Probation and parole revocation proceedings are not considered a critical stage under the federal constitution.  But every state requires counsel at probation revocation proceedings if the defendant so requests)
15. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 40 (1972) (right to counsel extends to all felony prosecutions and to misdemeanor prosecutions where incarceration is actually imposed)
16. Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 128 (1967) (sentencing hearing is a critical stage of the proceeding and counsel should be present, absent a waiver)

1. City of Cleveland v. Oke, 2018 Ohio 2846 (Ohio: Court of Appeals, 8th Appellate Dist. 2018) (double jeopardy when court sentenced defendant twice upon termination from drug court)
2. Hickman v. State, (Ind. Court of Appeals 6/29/2017) (imposition of sanctions in drug court and subsequent revocation did not constitute double jeopardy or res judicata)
3. DiMeglio v. State, 29 A.3d 663 (Md. App. 2011) (imposition of sanction for drinking and driving in DUI Court did not bar subsequent prosecution for DUI offense on double jeopardy grounds)
4. Doyle v. State, 302 S.W.3d 607, 607 (Ark. App. Feb.18, 2009) (double jeopardy not apply to revocation proceedings)
5. In re O.F. 773 N.W.2d 206, 206 (N.D. 2009) (imposition of drug court sanctions did not bar a subsequent prosecution and conviction for the identical conduct upon which the sanctions were based)
6. United States v. Carlton, 442 F.3d 802, 809 (2d Cir 2006) (double jeopardy problem is avoided by treating post-revocation sanctions as part of the penalty for the initial offense.)
7. State v. Griffin, 109 P.3d 870, 870 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005);(license revocation in addition to criminal prosecution not double jeopardy)
8. United States. v. McInnis, 429 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2005) (holding that double jeopardy does not apply to the revocation of supervised release because it is considered part of the original sentence)
9. People v. Lopez, 97 P.3d 223, 223 (Colo. Ct. App. 2004) aff’d on other grounds, 113 P.3d 713 (Colo. 2005)  (holding that sentencing for deferred judgment violations, including positive urine tests, does not violate double jeopardy)
10. C.H. v. State, 850 So.2d 675, 675 (Fla. 2003) (adding additional conditions to a defendant’s probation, such as drug court, without a violation of probation violates double jeopardy)
11. One Car v. State, 122 S.W.3d 422, 422 (Tex. App. 2003) (Because the double jeopardy clause prohibits multiple criminal penalties for the same conduct, vehicle forfeitures and driver’s license revocations do not violate the double jeopardy clause)
12. Witte v. United States, 515 U.S. 389, 405 (1995) (prohibition against being punished multiple times for the same offense does not prevent consideration of misconduct, upon imposition of the original sentence or upon re-sentencing)
13. United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 129 (1980) (double jeopardy clause protects against a second prosecution for the same offense after either an acquittal or a conviction and multiple criminal punishments for the same offense.)
14. Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 529 (1975) (the double jeopardy clause applies to any juvenile proceeding that has the potential to deprive the juvenile of liberty)

1. Settlement Agreement Between the United States and The Massachusetts Trial Court
   https://www.justice.gov/usao-ma/pr/us-attorney-s-office-settles-disability-discrimination-allegations-massachusetts-trialThe Department of Justice finds that denying access to opioid use disorder medication is a violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act. In this case, the Massachusetts Trial Court entered into a settlement agreement with the U.S. Attorney after an investigation into whether drug court personnel were interfering with or requiring that participants abstain from using medications to treat opioid use disorder. The Massachusetts Trial Court denied any wrong doing or that it violated the Americans with Disabilities Act. As part of the settlement agreement, the Trial Court developed policies designed to ensure that drug court participants shall not be denied access to legally prescribed OUD medications. Grievance procedures were also adopted.
2. Gass v. 52nd Judicial Dist. Lebanon Cty, 232 A. 3d 706 (Pa. 2020) (We are cognizant of the District's concerns that medical marijuana use by probationers may, in fact, cause difficulties with court supervision and treatment. As we have observed previously: "The concern that unintended consequences may unfold are prevalent relative to the promulgation of experimental, remedial legislation[.]" Williams v. City of Phila., 647 Pa. 126, 150, 188 A.3d 421, 436 (2018). Nevertheless, "[w]here the language of the governing statute is clear (or clear enough), ... the solution is legislative — and not judicial — adjustment." Id. at 150-51, 188 A.3d at 436. Along these lines, the Supreme Court of Montana has aptly observed that, "whether or not medical marijuana is ultimately a good idea is not the issue" before the courts. Nelson, 195 P.3d at 833) https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=17619307116072136159&q=%22232+A.+3d+706%22+&hl=en&scisbd=2&as_sdt=4006
3. State v. Heaston, 308 Ore. App. 694 (Ore. App. 2021) (Because marijuana is not a controlled substance, probationer did not violate the prohibition against the using controlled substances condition, even though he did not have a medical marijuana card)
   https://scholar.google.com/scholar?q=308+Ore.+App.+694+&hl=en&as_sdt=4006
4. People v. Thue, ___ Mich. App. ___, ___ N.W. 3d ___ (Mich. App. 2/21/21) (“We conclude that provisions of the Michigan Probation Act that allow a court to prohibit a probationer's MMMA-compliant use of marijuana impermissibly conflict with MCL 333.26427(a) and (e) of the MMMA and are unenforceable. Further, the revocation of probation upon the MMMA-compliant use of marijuana constitutes a "penalty" in violation of MCL 333.26424(a) of the MMMA.”)
   https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=11226599400526143712&q=thue&hl=en&as_sdt=4006
5. Gass v. 52nd Judicial Dist. Lebanon Cty, 232 A. 3d 706 (Pa. 2020) (We are cognizant of the District's concerns that medical marijuana use by probationers may, in fact, cause difficulties with court supervision and treatment. As we have observed previously: "The concern that unintended consequences may unfold are prevalent relative to the promulgation of experimental, remedial legislation[.]" Williams v. City of Phila., 647 Pa. 126, 150, 188 A.3d 421, 436 (2018). Nevertheless, "[w]here the language of the governing statute is clear (or clear enough), ... the solution is legislative — and not judicial — adjustment." Id. at 150-51, 188 A.3d at 436.Along these lines, the Supreme Court of Montana has aptly observed that, "whether or not medical marijuana is ultimately a good idea is not the issue" before the courts. Nelson, 195 P.3d at 833)https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=17619307116072136159&q=%22232+A.+3d+706%22+&hl=en&scisbd=2&as_sdt=4006State v. Heaston, 308 Ore. App. 694 (Ore. App. 2021) (Because marijuana is not a controlled substance, probationer did not violate the prohibition against the using controlled substances condition, even though he did not have a medical marijuana card)https://scholar.google.com/scholar?q=308+Ore.+App.+694+&hl=en&as_sdt=4006People v. Thue, ___ Mich. App. ___, ___ N.W. 3d ___ (Mich. App. 2/21/21) (“We conclude that provisions of the Michigan Probation Act that allow a court to prohibit a probationer's MMMA-compliant use of marijuana impermissibly conflict with MCL 333.26427(a) and (e) of the MMMA and are unenforceable. Further, the revocation of probation upon the MMMA-compliant use of marijuana constitutes a "penalty" in violation of MCL 333.26424(a) of the MMMA.”)https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=11226599400526143712&q=thue&hl=en&as_sdt=4006
6. Walton v. People, 2019 CO 95, 451 P.3d 1212 (2019) (The Colorado Supreme Court holds that the statute's plain language creates a presumption that a defendant who is sentenced to a term of probation may use medical marijuana unless one of the enumerated exceptions applies. The prosecution bears the burden of overcoming the presumption. The relevant exception in this case requires the court to make particularized findings, based on material evidence, that prohibiting this defendant's otherwise-authorized medical marijuana use is necessary and appropriate to promote statutory sentencing goals.)
7. In the matter of KL, 451 P. 3d 518 (Mont: Supreme Court 2019) (In reversing the termination of parental rights, the Court observed that the duties of DSS include: Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) requires when a parent fails to engage satisfactorily with the Department, the Department still must try to engage the parent.[12] The Department must assist in getting the parent engaged in services and document its attempts to do so. While coordinating with services parents receive through other court programs such as drug court is laudatory and should occur to avoid not only duplication of effort but also to avoid overwhelming the parent, the Department must coordinate actively with those court programs, monitor the parent's programming and progress, and actively assist the parent in utilizing and accessing identified resources to complete treatment plan tasks not provided through the other court program. The Department must also meaningfully communicate with the other entity providing services and accurately advise the court and the parties as to the parent's progress or lack thereof and actively address with the parent any barriers precluding the Department's interaction with the other entity on an ongoing basis. Further, to satisfy its obligation to provide active efforts, the Department has an ongoing responsibility to assist the parent with visitation and make sure it occurs progressively throughout the case.)
8. Copeland v. CAAIR, INC., (Dist. Court, ND Oklahoma 2019) (class action complaint by drug court participants against residential treatment facility stated claims including involuntary servitude and forced labor.)
9. People v. Lora, 66 Misc. 3d 241 (NY: Supreme Court 2019) (Court has statutory authority pursuant to Criminal Procedure Law § 160.58 to conditionally seal criminal records of defendants who successfully complete a judicial diversion drug treatment program.)
10. Pesce v. Coppinger, 355 F. Supp. 3d 35 (D. Mass. 11/26/18) (Court grants preliminary injunction mandating that Plaintiff be given his prescribed methadone for the 60 days jail sentence because to not provide him with methadone was a violation of the ADA and constituted cruel and unusual punishment under 8^th Amendment)
11. Smith v. Aroostook, 376 F. Supp. 3d 146 (D. Me. 3/27/19), affirmed by the First Circuit Court of Appeals in Smith v. Aroostook, No. 19-1340 (1st Cir. April 30, 2019___ F. 3d. ___ (1st Circuit 4/30/2019),  (Court granted a preliminary injunction against a jail using a similar ADA rationale and citing Pesce, where the detention facility refused to provide the defendant MAT (buprenorphine) during the defendant’s 40 days of incarceration.)
12. Bazzle v. State, 434 P. 3d 1090 (Wyo. Supreme Court  2019) (Mr. Bazzle was obligated, under the probation order, to successfully complete the Treatment Court Program. He was aware that he could not participate in the program until he ceased using Suboxone. If he was unable or unwilling to comply with the probation condition, he was required to petition the district court for modification rather than make the unilateral choice not to comply. The district court's conclusion that Mr. Bazzle willfully violated the term of his probation that required him to successfully complete the Treatment Court Program is supported by the evidence.)
13. People v. Stanton, 60 Misc. 3d 1020  (NY: County Court 2018) (In non-drug court case, defendant permitted to use medical marijuana as condition of probation)
14. Fochtman v. DARP, INC., Dist. Court, WD Arkansas 2018 (in putative federal class action lawsuit claiming violations of rights and statutes, arising from Plaintiffs' drug-court ordered participation in DARP's substance abuse recovery program, where DARP required Plaintiffs to work in Defendant Hendren's plastics plant. The federal court ordered  that Defendants’ DARP and Hendren's Motions to Dismiss (are GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART as follows: (1) Defendants' Motions to Dismiss Counts I (Failure to Pay Minimum Wage) and II (Failure to Pay Overtime) are DENIED; and (2) Defendants Motions to Dismiss Counts III (Slavery/Involuntary Servitude) and IV (Arkansas Human Trafficking Act) are GRANTED.
15. Beisel v. Espinosa, Dist. Court, (MD Florida 2017) (While Beisel would have preferred a program integrating the use of narcotic medications, Espinosa's threatening to sanction Beisel if Beisel took narcotics obtained outside of the program does not qualify as deliberate indifference to Beisel's medical needs. Cf. Fredericks v. Huggins, 711 F.2d 31, 33-34 (4th Cir. 1983)(holding that requiring pre-trial detainees to stop methadone "cold turkey," causing them to suffer withdrawal, is not an unconstitutional violation of their civil rights). 
16. State v. Guise, Iowa: Court of Appeals 2018 (Use of the Iowa Risk Revised assessment tool at sentencing was improper, where court rejected plea agreement solely based on the IRR results. The court observed: “On this record, we only know that the IRR authorized intensive supervision. We do not know what the IRR is, what factors led to the recommendation of intensive supervision, or whether the factors were appropriate for consideration in the sentencing context. It is impossible to determine whether the IRR was relevant to the question of sentencing within the meaning of section 901.2(1). …… To reiterate, our record contains no information on what the IRR was intended to measure, how it was scored, what factors were considered in arriving at a score, or how the PSI evaluator applied the test to Guise. See Klingele, 91 Notre Dame L. Rev. at 576 ("As an initial matter, risk is a squishy concept and its variations (low, medium, and high) are subject to all manner of manipulation."). The IRR as described in Guise's PSI report was a black box, devoid of transparency.
17. Beisel v. Espinosa, Dist. Court, (MD Florida 2017) (While Beisel would have preferred a program integrating the use of narcotic medications, Espinosa's threatening to sanction Beisel if Beisel took narcotics obtained outside of the program does not qualify as deliberate indifference to Beisel's medical needs. Cf. Fredericks v. Huggins, 711 F.2d 31, 33-34 (4th Cir. 1983)(holding that requiring pre-trial detainees to stop methadone "cold turkey," causing them to suffer withdrawal, is not an unconstitutional violation of their civil rights).
18. State v. Nichols, (Wisc.  Court of Appeals, 4th Dist. 3/2/2017)( To the extent that the sentencing court considered information regarding Nichols' experiences in drug court, we are satisfied that the court did not improperly rely on information prohibited by the drug court contract. Court finds that information relied upon came from sources other than what occurred in drug court including letters from defendant’s mother.)
19. State v. Loomis, 2016 WI 68 (Wisc. 2016) (consideration of risk assessment, such as   COMPAS, at sentencing is permissible, reliance on such a tool is violation of due process because it would be sentencing on group data and the Constitution requires individualized sentencing.)
20. People v. JIHAN QQ., 2017 NY Slip Op 4524  (NY Appellate Div., 3rd Dept. 2017) (Sealing of drug court participant’s record was warranted although her case predated legislation)
21. State v. Loomis, 2016 WI 68 (Wisc. 2016) (consideration of risk assessment, such as   COMPAS, at sentencing is permissible, reliance on such a tool is violation of due process because it would be sentencing on group data and the Constitution requires individualized sentencing.)
22. Watson v. Kentucky,  _____F. Supp. 2d ____, (E.D. Kentucky 7/7/15) ( At the hearing, Watson requested the state court take her off the conditional release terms or remove the "blanket prohibition on her taking Suboxone, Methadone or any other drugs that she needs" to treat her addiction. The state attorney clarified that there was not a blanket prohibition on MAT drug use, but that "it's generally the Court's practice to allow [MAT drug use] if the doctor will show [] medical need." The court agreed and instructed Watson to produce "medical proof and recommendations from a treating physician" that she needs to use MAT drugs as part of her treatment.. Watson also asked the state court to declare Kentucky's policy with regards to MAT drugs in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), the Rehabilitation Act. The state court denied Watson's request. At the hearing, Watson did not raise any other claims, constitutional or otherwise. Watson filed a complaint in federal court challenging the medication condition. She claims that conditioning her use of narcotics on a court's review of a doctor's note violates the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act, the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the United States Constitution, and § 2 of the Kentucky Constitution. Watson asks the Court to enjoin the Kentucky Administrative Office of the Courts from enforcing the medication condition. Held: Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971) bars Watson’s claims because they can be adequately dealt with in state court.)
23. Reed-Kaliher v. Hoggatt, ___ Ariz. ___, ___ P.3d ___ (2015), (holding  that § 36-2811(B)(1) prohibits a trial court from conditioning probation on refraining from possessing or using medical marijuana in compliance with Arizona Medical Marijuana Act).
24. Polk v. Hancock, ___ Ariz. ___, ___ P.3d ___ (2015) (holding  that § 36-2811(B)(1) prohibits a trial court from conditioning probation on refraining from possessing or using medical marijuana in compliance with Arizona Medical Marijuana Act).
25. State v. Sykes, ____ P. 3d ____ (Wash. 12/18/14) (Adult drug courts are philosophically,   functionally, and intentionally different from ordinary criminal courts. Based on their unique characteristics, we hold that adult drug court staff meetings are not subject to the open courts provision of article I, section 10 of the Washington State Constitution. Whether adult drug court staff meetings are presumptively open or closed is left to the discretion of the individual drug courts.)
26. State v. Plouffe, 2014 MT 183, 329 P.3d 1255 (Mont. 2014) (Under statewide drug court protocols, defendant had to be honest and treatment providers could not use drug court disclosed information, such as drug testing with individuals not part of the drug court team.  When non-team members obtained statements from the drug court participant under circumstances where he was in a penalty position, the statements were not admissible.  Plouffe was impermissibly required to "choose between making incriminating  statements and jeopardizing his conditional liberty by remaining silent,"
    Fuller, 276 Mont. at 166-67, 915 P.2d at 816 (citing Murphy,m465 U.S. at 436, 104 S. Ct. at 1147), because Plouffe believed that he had to answer questions honestly in order to comply with Treatment Court rules.)
27. Jackson v. Indiana, No. 48A05-1403-CR-106.Court of Appeals of Indiana ( September 16, 2014) Not Selected for Publication  (Defendants significant medical condition did not excuse him from complying with drug court conditions, including refraining from lying and continuing his contact with drug court)
28. State v. Schively, Arizona Appeals, Division 1 (5/13/14) (Insufficient evidence supported the superior court's conclusion that Shively "refused" drug treatment within the meaning of § 13-901.01(G). The only evidence offered at the hearing was that Shively used and possessed heroin while in a residential drug treatment program. But we have held that "evidence that one possessed or used drugs is not equivalent to evidence that one refused to participate in drug treatment.")
29. Coats v. Dish Network , 303 P.3d 147 (2013)(even though Colorado has legalized marijuana, it is not a legal activity and employee can be fired for testing positive for marijuana.)
30. In re Joshua C., A136438 (Cal. App. 8-6-2013) NOT SELECTED for PUBLICATION (Analyzes factors to determine when medical marijuana use may be permitted as a condition of probation, relying on People v. Leal, 210 Cal.App.4th 829 (2012))
31. Savage v. Maine Pretrial Services, Inc.., 2013 ME 9 (2013) (Jody Savage appeals from a judgment dismissing Count I of her complaint alleging that the termination of her employment by Maine Pretrial Services was a violation of the Maine Medical Use of Marijuana Act (MMUMA or Act), 22 M.R.S. § 2421-2430-B (2012). She argues that her application for a license to operate a medical marijuana dispensary was "authorized conduct" within the meaning of the Act and her subsequent termination was thus a penalty prohibited by the Act. We affirm the trial court's judgment dismissing Count I of Savage's complaint.)
32. Tennessee v. Michelle Lee, No. M2011-01669-CCA-R3-CD.  Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee, at Nashville. (Opinion Filed November 15, 2012)  (recognizing in the termination of drug court and probation, the need to treat drug court participant who is engaged but still relapses more lenient than  a participant who is not engaged.)
33. In Re the Matter of R.A.,  2012 OK CIV APP 65 (2012) (“Based upon our review of the record, this Court finds the three ISPs entered in this case failed to adequately address the actual "condition" Mother needs to correct — her mental illness. Mother's substance abuse clearly follows and flows directly from her mental health condition. Matter of C.R.T., , 66 P.3d at 1010. Mother's history of significant trauma leading her to need to self-medicate is a condition that the psychological evaluation and Ms. Wilburn both conceded could not be corrected "solely through the efforts of Mother" without "medical, psychiatric, and psychological intervention." Id., 66 P.3d at 1009. As such, termination of Mother's parental rights based upon a failure to correct conditions where Mother's mental health condition was not correctly identified and/or addressed by DHS constitutes a violation of Mother's substantive due process rights.[fn9]Id. ¶ 34 Additionally, the ISPs failed to effectively offer Mother the "opportunity to ameliorate [her] condition and to effectively defend against termination efforts" by failing to adequately address her mental illness. Matter of C.G. , 637 P.2d at 68. While evidence was presented to show Mother failed to correct the conditions stated in her ISPs, the ISPs failed to properly identify, address or offer services specifically directed to the recognized cause of Mother's substance abuse — her severe mental health issues. In failing to incorporate the information and recommendations garnered from Mother's November 2010 court-ordered psychological evaluation into her ISP, Mother was not afforded the full spectrum of procedural safeguards to guard against termination of her parental rights.”)
34. People v. Watkins, No. 10CA0579, Court of Appeals of Colorado, February 2, 2012 (constitutional authorization to use medical marijuana did not trump statutory condition of probation prohibiting commission of crime including federal crime which includes use of marijuana)
35. Legal Action Center, “Legality of Denying Access to Medication Assisted Treatment In The Criminal Justice System” (LAC 12/1/11)
36. Beinor v. ICAO, 262 P.3d 970 (Colo. App.2011) (constitutional authorization to use medical marijuana did not trump employer’s prohibition against drug usage and firing w/o unemployment compensation benefits upheld)
37. Harris v. Lake County Jail, No. C 09-3168 SI (pr), (N.D. Cal. 5-2-2011) (The Eighth Amendment claim of cruel and unusual punishment relating to medical treatment in an incarcerative setting requires that there be an objectively serious medical need. Harris does not, however, provide sufficient evidence to allow a reasonable jury to find that he suffered degenerative disk disease or any other medical condition making it impossible for him to walk without the use of marijuana.  Summary judgment granted)
38. People v. Ray Earl Webb, No. D056735 (Court of Appeals of California, Fourth District, Division One, March 15, 2011) UNPUBLISHED (defendant not denied due process or other constitutional rights when he was rejected for drug court because he was taking strong narcotic medicines which would interfere with his ability to participate in the drug court program)
39. U. S. v. Small, ___F. Supp. 3d ___Cause No. CR-10-91-BLG-RFC (D. Mont. 2010) (defendant on pre trial release not entitled to use medical marijuana even with a prescription and even though Montana Supreme Court permitted state probationers to do so. The court noted: The right to use marijuana, however, is not a fundamental right and the authority of the United States to prohibit the use of marijuana has already been decided. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005); Raich v. Gonzales, 500 F.3d 850 (9th Cir. 2007))
40. Rogers, Fred, “On Prohibiting the Use of Medical Marijuana by Persons Granted Probation”, Judges Journal, (Fall 2010)
41. People v. Beaty, 181 Cal.App.4th 644, 105 Cal.Rptr.3d 76 (2010) (the authorized use of medical marijuana does not by itself make a nonviolent drug offender unamenable to the treatment mandated by Prop. 36)
42. Mellender v. Dane County, ___F. Supp ___ (W. D. Wisc. 2006) (allegations that defendants exhibited deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs by discontinuing his methadone prescription and enforcing a policy that restricts inmates from receiving prescription methadone pass summary judgment standard)
43. Sharp v. Weston, 233 F.3d 1166, 1172 (9th Cir. 2000) (due process clause of Fourteenth Amendment "requires states to provide civilly-committed persons with access to mental health treatment that gives them a realistic opportunity to be cured and released")
44. Abdul-Akbar v. Department of Corrections, 910 F. Supp. 986, 1002 (D. Del. 1995) (Indeed, pretrial detainees and prisoners have no constitutional right to drug treatment or other rehabilitation)
45. Monmouth County Corr. Institutional Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 346 (3d Cir. 1987) (to establish an Eighth Amendment violation, it must be established that the institution acted with deliberate indifference to the inmates serious medical needs.  A medical need is "serious" if it is "one that has been diagnosed by a physician as requiring treatment or one that is so obvious that a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor's attention.")
46. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 317-19 (1982) (involuntarily committed persons have a constitutional right to minimally adequate treatment and training to ensure safety and freedom from undue restraint)
47. Norris v. Frame, 585 F.2d 1183, 1188 (3d Cir. 1978) (pretrial detainees had no constitutional right to receive the drug methadone, unless it was prescribed before their detention)
48. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976) (The Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment places on prison officials an "obligation to provide medical care for those whom [they are] punishing by incarceration)
49. Cudnik v. Kreiger, 392 F. Supp. 305 (N.D. Ohio 1974) (it is a due process violation to prohibit the administration of prescribed methadone to pretrial detainees)

1. Llewellyn S. George v. City of White Plains, N.Y.; City Court of White Plains, N.Y.; Joann Friia, No.210-CV-10457 (S.D. New York, July 18, 2022). The Court dismissed a drug court participant’s complaint alleging that the Judge violated his constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. The Court found that the Judge has absolute immunity for suit for damages for any  actions taken within the scope of their judicial responsibilities.
   https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=279616322634651667&hl=en&lr=lang_en&as_sdt=6,47&as_vis=1&oi=scholaralrt&html=&pos=0&folt=kw
2. United States v. Freeman, 992 F.3d 268, 274 (4th Cir. 2021) (In unprecedented decision, 4^th Circuit holds within guidelines sentence for prescription-addicted opiate pill seller was unreasonable)https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=15498572638203304982&q=%22992+F.+3d+268%22&hl=en&scisbd=2&as_sdt=4006
3. Sturkin v. Patrick, Dist. Court, SD Mississippi (5/10/2019) (plaintiff, former drug court client awarded over $69,000 in attorney fees in addition to the $350,000 jury verdict because of harassment by her Drug Court Parole Officer)
4. LAVITE v. Dunstan, Dist. Court, (SD Illinois 2018) (Denying summary judgment motion, in large part, in suit against county and sheriff, brought by decorated vet, who formed Veterans Treatment Court, when he had a PTSD incident and was then barred from county buildings).
5. Hoffman v. KNOEBEL, (Dist. Court, SD Indiana 2017)(Dismissing claims against sheriff and drug court employees but observing: “ In conclusion, we acknowledge Plaintiffs' pervasive, palpable frustration in waging this legal assault, which feeling arises out of their inability to overcome the central obstacle to their success, that is, the fact that the primary tortfeasor responsible for their constitutional deprivations was Clark Circuit Court Judge Jerome Jacobi acting in his role as the presiding judge of the Drug Treatment Court……. In appropriate cases, state actors, including judges, may be subject to suit for prospective injunctive relief to enjoin their future unconstitutional practices from being committed in their official capacities. Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522 (1984). This avenue of relief typically is available to a person confined by a state who seeks to challenge the fact or duration of his confinement. Here, however, such remedies are not available because, following the reports of due process violations to the Indiana Judicial Center, the DTC was decertified, the remaining participants were allowed to complete the Program under the guidance of Chief Judge Carmichael, Judge Jacobi was removed from office (along with several members of his staff), and the operations of the problem-solving court officially ended in June 2015.)
6. Sturkin v. Patrick, ___ F. Supp. 3d ___, (Dist. Court, SD Mississippi 2017)(Claimant’s assertion that her drug court parole officer harassed her stated §1983 claim and not barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994)).
7. SM v. Lincoln County, ___ F. 3d ___, (8th Circuit Court of Appeals, 2017) (affirming substantial verdict against County for failure to supervise drug court tracker who was sexually assaulting drug court participants and whose job involved monitoring drug court participants by home visits and other supervision tools.
8. Carlisle v. Normand, Dist. Court, ED Louisiana 2017 and 2018 (§1983 Civil Rights claim based on allegations that Drug Court violated their constitutional rights by imprisoning them without due process, in the form of probation sanctions, contempt convictions, and time spent waiting dismissed because under Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994)--a defendant may not impugn a state sentence unless the sentence has already been invalidated)https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=6590451739034794889&q=+Carlisle+v.+Normand&hl=en&scisbd=2&as_sdt=800003&as_ylo=2017https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=10670503861955622910&hl=en&lr=lang_en&as_sdt=40006&as_vis=1&oi=scholaralrt&hist=f_OieYgAAAAJ:5630771474538523222:AAGBfm